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The Gossiping Insert-Eliminate Algorithm for Multi-Agent Bandits
Ronshee Chawla∗†, Abishek Sankararaman∗‡, Ayalvadi Ganesh§and Sanjay Shakkottai¶
Abstract
We consider a decentralized multi-agent Multi Armed Bandit (MAB) setup consisting of N
agents, solving the same MAB instance to minimize individual cumulative regret. In our model,
agents collaborate by exchanging messages through pairwise gossip style communications on an
arbitrary connected graph. We develop two novel algorithms, where each agent only plays from
a subset of all the arms. Agents use the communication medium to recommend only arm-IDs
(not samples), and thus update the set of arms from which they play. We establish that, if
agents communicate Ω(log(T )) times through any connected pairwise gossip mechanism, then
every agent’s regret is a factor of order N smaller compared to the case of no collaborations.
Furthermore, we show that the communication constraints only have a second order effect on
the regret of our algorithm. We then analyze this second order term of the regret to derive
bounds on the regret-communication tradeoffs. Finally, we empirically evaluate our algorithm
and conclude that the insights are fundamental and not artifacts of our bounds. We also show a
lower bound which gives that the regret scaling obtained by our algorithm cannot be improved
even in the absence of any communication constraints. Our results demonstrate that even a
minimal level of collaboration among agents greatly reduces regret for all agents.
1 Introduction
Multi Armed Bandit (MAB) is a classical model ([23],[8]), that captures the explore-exploit trade-off
in making online decisions. MAB paradigms have found applications in many large scale systems
such as ranking on search engines [35], displaying advertisements on e-commerce web-sites [11],
model selection for classification [25] and real-time operation of wireless networks [5]. Oftentimes
in these settings, the decision making is distributed among many agents. For example, in the con-
text of web-servers serving either search ranking or placing advertisements, due to the the volume
and rate of user requests, multiple servers are deployed to perform the same task [10]. Each server,
makes decisions (which can be modeled as a MAB [35]) on rankings or placing advertisements
and also collaborate with other servers by communicating over a network [10]. In this paper, we
study a multi-agent MAB model in which agents collaborate to reduce individual cumulative regret.
Model Overview - Our model generalizes the problem setting described in [31]. Concretely, our
model consists of N agents, each playing the same instance of a K armed stochastic MAB, to
minimize its cumulative regret. At each time, every agent pulls an arm and receives a stochastic
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reward independent of everything else (including other agents choosing the same arm at the same
time). Additionally, an agent can choose after an arm pull, to receive a message from another
agent through an information pull. Agents have a communication budget, which limits how many
times an agent can pull information. If any agent i ∈ {1, · · · , N} chooses to receive a message
through an information-pull, then it will contact another agent j chosen independent of everything
else, at random from a distribution P (i, ·) (unknown to the agents) over {1, · · · , N}. The agents
thus cannot actively choose from whom they can receive information, rather they receive from an-
other randomly chosen agent. The N ×N matrix P with its ith row being the distribution P (i, ·)
is denoted as the gossip matrix. Agents take actions (arm-pulls, information-pulls and messages
sent) only as a function of their past history of arm-pulls, rewards and received messages from
information-pulls and is hence decentralized.
Model Motivations - The problem formulation and the communication constraints aim to capture
key features of many settings involving multiple agents making distributed decisions. We highlight
two examples in which our model is applicable. The first example is a setting consisting of N
computer servers (or agents), each handling requests for web searches from different users on the
internet [9, 24]. For each keyword, one out of a set of M ad-words needs to be displayed, which
can be viewed as choosing an arm of a MAB. Here, each server is making decisions on which ad
to display (for the chosen keyword) independently of other servers. Further, the rewards obtained
by different servers are independent because the search users are different at different servers. The
servers can also communicate with each other over a network in order to collaborate in order to
maximize revenue (i.e., minimize cumulative regret).
A second example is that of collaborative recommendation systems, e.g., where multiple agents
(users) in a social network are jointly exploring restaurants in a city [31]. The users correspond to
agents, and each restaurant can be modeled as an arm of a MAB providing stochastic feedback.
The users can communicate with each other over a social network, personal contact or a messaging
platform to receive recommendation of restaurants (arms) from others to minimize their cumulative
regret, where regret corresponds to the loss in utility incurred by each user per restaurant visit.
Furthermore, if the restaurants/customers can be categorized into a finite set of contexts (say, e.g.
by price: low-cost/mid-price/high-end, type of cuisine: italian, asian, etc.), our model is applicable
per context.
Key Contributions:
1. Gossiping Insert-Eliminate (GosInE) Algorithm - In our algorithms (Algorithm 1 and 3),
agents only choose to play from among a small subset (of cardinality dKN e+2) of arms at each time.
Agents in our algorithm accept the communication budget as an input and use the communication
medium to recommend arms, i.e., agents communicate the arm-ID of their current estimated best
arm. Specifically, agents do not exchange samples, but only recommend an arm index. On receiving
a recommendation, an agent updates the set of arms to play from: it discards its estimated worst
arm in its current set and replaces it by the recommended new arm.
Thus, our algorithm is non monotone with respect to the set of arms an agent plays from, as
agents can discard an arm in a phase and then subsequently bring the arm back and play it in a
later phase, if this previously discarded arm gets recommended by another agent. This is in con-
trast to most other bandit algorithms in the literature. On one hand, classical regret minimization
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algorithms such as UCB-α [3] or Thompson sampling [34] allow sampling from any arm at all points
in time (no arm ever discarded). On the other hand, pure explore algorithms such as successive
rejects [2] are monotone with respect to the arms, i.e., a discarded arm is never subsequently played
again. The social learning algorithm in [31] is also monotone, as the subset of arms from which an
agent plays at any time is non-decreasing. In contrast, in this paper we show that even if an agent
(erroneously) discards the best arm from its playing set, the recommendations ensures that with
probability 1, eventually the best arm is back in the playing set.
2. Regret of GosInE Algorithm - Despite agents playing among a time-varying set of arms of
cardinality dKN e+2, we show that the regret of any agent is (Theorems 1 and 3) O
(( dK
N
e+1
∆2
log(T )
))
+
C. Here, ∆2 is the difference in the mean rewards of the best and second best arm and C is a con-
stant depending on communication constraints and independent of time. We show that the regret
scaling holds for any connected gossip matrix P and communication budget scaling as Ω(log(T )).
Thus, any agent’s asymptotic regret is independent of the the gossip matrix P or the communication
budget (Corollary 5). If agents never collaborate (communication budget of 0), the system is iden-
tical to each agent playing a standard K arm MAB, in which case the regret scales as O
(
K
∆2
log(T )
)
[21],[3]. Thus, our algorithms reduce the regret of any agent by a factor of order N from the case
of no collaborations. Furthermore, a lower bound in Theorem 4 (and the discussion in Section 6)
shows that this scaling with respect to K and N cannot be improved by any algorithm, commu-
nication budget or gossip matrix. Specifically, we show that even if an agent has knowledge of the
entire system history of arms pulled and rewards obtained by other agents, the regret incurred by
every agent is only a factor of order N smaller than the case of no collaborations. Moreover, our
regret scaling significantly improves over that of [31], which applies only to the complete graph
among agents, in which the regret scales as O
( dK
N
e+log(N)
∆2
log(T )
)
. Thus, despite communication
constraints, our algorithm leverages collaboration effectively.
3. Communication/Regret Trade-Off - The second order constant term in our regret bound
captures the trade-off between communications and regret. As an example, we show in Corollary
6 that, if the communication budgets scale polynomially, i.e., agents can pull information at-most
t1/β times over a time horizon of t, for some β > 1, then if the agents are connected by a ring graph
(the graph with poorest connectivity), the constant term in the regret scales as (N)β (upto poly-
logarithmic factor), whereas the regret scales as (log(N))β, in the case when agents are connected
by the complete graph. Thus, we see that there is an exponential improvement (in the additive
constant) in the regret incurred, when changing the network among agents from the ring graph
to the complete graph. In general, we give through an explicit formula (in Corollary 6) that, if
the gossip matrix P has smaller conductance (i.e., a poorly connected network), then the regret
incurred by any agent is higher. Similarly, we also establish the fact that if the communication
budget per agent is higher, then the regret incurred is lower (Corollary 7).We further conduct
numerical studies that establish these are fundamental and not artifacts of our bounds.
2 Problem Setup
Our model generalizes the setting in [31]. In particular, our model, imposes communication bud-
gets and allows for general gossip matrices P , while the model in [31] considered only the complete
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graph among agents.
Arms of the MAB - We consider N agents, each playing the same instance of a K armed stochas-
tic MAB to minimize cumulative regret. The K arms have unknown average rewards denoted by
µ1, · · · , µK , where for every i ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, µi ∈ (0, 1). Without loss of generality, we assume
1 > µ1 > µ2 ≥ µ3 · · · ≥ µK ≥ 0. However, the agents are not aware of this ordering. For all
j ∈ {2, · · · ,K}, denote by ∆j := µ1 − µj . The assumption on the arm-means imply that ∆j > 0,
for all j ∈ {2, · · · ,K}.
Network among Agents - We suppose that the agents are connected by a network denoted by
a N ×N gossip matrix P , where for each i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, the ith row P (i, ·) is a probability distri-
bution over {1, · · · , N}. This matrix is fixed and unknown to the agents.
Agent Actions - We assume that time is slotted (discrete), with each time slot divided into an
arm-pulling phase followed by an information-pulling phase. In the arm-pulling phase, all agents
pull one of the K arms and observe a stochastic Bernoulli reward, independent of everything else.
In the information pulling phase, if an agent has communication budget, it can decide to receive
a message from another agent through an information pull. A non-negative and non-decreasing
sequence (Bt)t∈N specifies the communication budget, where no agent can pull information for
more than Bt times in the first t time slots for all t ≥ 0. If any agent i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, chooses to
pull information in the information-pulling phase of any time slot, it will contact another agent
j ∈ {1, · · · , N} chosen independently of everything else, according to the probability distribution
given by P (i, ·). Thus, agents receive information from a randomly chosen agent according to a
fixed distribution, rather than actively choosing the agents based on observed samples. When any
agent j is contacted by another agent in the information pulling phase of a time-slot, agent j can
communicate a limited (O
(
log(NK)
)
number of bits. Crucially, the message length does not de-
pend on the arm-means or on the time index.
Decentralized System - Each action of an agent, i.e., its arm pull, decision to engage in an
information pull and the message to send when requested by another agent’s information pull, can
only depend on the agent’s past history of arms pulled, rewards obtained and messages received
from information pulls. We allow each agent’s actions in the information pulling phase (such as
whether to pull information and what message to communicate if asked for), to depend on the
agent’s outcome in the arm-pulling phase of that time slot.
Performance Metric - Each agent minimizes their expected cumulative regret. For an agent
i ∈ {1, · · · , N} and time t ∈ N, denote by I(i)t ∈ {1, · · · ,K} to be the arm pulled by agent i in the
arm-pulling phase of time slot t. The regret of agent i ∈ N, after T time slots (arm-pulls) is defined
as R
(i)
T :=
∑T
t=1(µ1 − µI(i)t ) and the expected cumulative regret is E[R
(i)
T ]
1.
1Expectation is with respect to all randomness, i.e., rewards, communications and possibly the algorithm.
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3 Synchronous GosInE Algorithm
We describe the algorithm by fixing an agent i ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
Input Parameters - The algorithm has three inputs (i) a communication budget (Bt)t∈N, (ii)
α > 0 and (iii) ε > 0. From this communication budget, we construct a sequence (Ax)x∈N such
that
Ax = max
(
min{t ∈ N, Bt ≥ x}, d(1 + x)1+εe
)
. (1)
Every agent, only pulls information in time slots (Ax)x∈N. This automatically respects the com-
munication budget constraints. Since agents engage in information pulling at common time slots,
we term the algorithm, synchronous. The parameter  ensures that the time intervals between the
instants when agents request for an arm are well separated. In particular, having ε > 0 ensures that
the inter-communication times scale at least polynomially in time. As we shall see in the analysis,
this only affects the regret scaling in the second order term.
Initialization - Associated with each agent i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, is a sticky2 set of arms -
Ŝ(i) =
{(
(i− 1)
⌈
K
N
⌉
mod K
)
+ 1, · · · ,
(
i
⌈
K
N
⌉
− 1 mod K
)
+ 1
}
. (2)
Notice that the cardinality |Ŝ(i)| = dKN e. In words, we are partitioning the total set of arms,
into sets of size dKN e with the property that
⋃N
i=1 Ŝ
(i) = {1, · · · ,K}. For instance, if K = N , then
for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, Ŝ(i) = {i}. Denote by the set U (i)0 = {idKN e mod K} and L
(i)
0 = {idKN e+ 1
mod K} and
S
(i)
0 = Ŝ
(i) ∪ U (i)0 ∪ L(i)0 . (3)
UCB within a phase - The algorithm proceeds in phases with all agents starting in phase 0.
Each phase j ≥ 1 lasts from time-slots Aj−1 + 1 till time-slot Aj , both inclusive3. We shall fix a
phase j ≥ 0 henceforth in the description. For any arm l ∈ {1, · · · ,K} and any time t ∈ N, T (i)l (t)
is the total number of times agent i has pulled arm l, upto and including time t and by µ̂
(i)
l (t),
the empirical observed mean4. Agent i in phase j, chooses arms from S
(i)
j according to the UCB-α
policy of [3] where the arm is selected from arg max
l∈S(i)j
(
µ̂
(i)
l (t− 1) +
√
α ln(t)
T
(i)
l (t−1)
)
.
Pull Information at the end of a phase - The message received (arm-ID in our algorithm) in
the information-pulling phase of time slot Aj is denoted by O(i)j ∈ {1, · · · ,K}. Every agent, when
asked for a message in the information-pulling phase of time-slot Aj , will send the arm-ID it played
the most in phase j.
Update arms at the beginning of a phase - If O(i)j ∈ S(i)j , then S(i)j+1 = S(i)j . Else, agent i dis-
cards the least played arm in phase j from the set S
(i)
j \ Ŝ(i) and accepts the recommendation O(i)j ,
2The choice of term sticky is explained in the sequel.
3We use the convention A−1 = 0
4 µ̂
(i)
l (t) = 0 if T
(i)
l (t) = 0
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Algorithm 1 Synch GosInE Algorithm (at Agent i)
1: Input : Communication Budgets (Bt)t∈N and UCB Parameter α, ε > 0
2: Initialization: Ŝ(i), S
(i)
0 according to Equations (2) and (3) respectively.
3: j ← 0
4: Aj = max
(
min{t ≥ 0, Bt ≥ j}, d(1 + j)1+εe
)
. Reparametrize the communication budget
5: for Time t ∈ N do
6: Pull - arg max
l∈S(j)i
(
µ̂
(i)
l (t− 1) +
√
α ln(t)
T
(i)
l (t−1)
)
7: if t == Aj then . End of Phase
8: O(i)j ← GetArm(i, j)
9: if O(i)j 6∈ S(j)i then
10: U
(i)
j+1 ← arg maxl∈{U(i)j ,L(i)j }(Tl(Aj)− Tl(Aj−1)) . The most played arm
11: L
(i)
j+1 ← O(i)j
12: S
(i)
j+1 ← Ŝ(i) ∪ L(i)j+1 ∪ U (i)j+1 . Update the set of playing arms
13: else
14: S
(i)
j+1 ← S(i)j .
15: j ← j + 1
16: Aj = max
(
min{t ≥ 0, Bt ≥ j}, d(1 + j)1+εe
)
. Reparametrize the communication
budget
Algorithm 2 Synchronous Arm Recommendation
1: procedure Getarm((i, j)) . Input an agent i and Phase j
2: m ∼ P (i, ·) . Sample another agent
3: return arg max
l∈S(j)m
(
T
(m)
l (Aj)− T (m)l (Aj−1)
)
. Most Played arm in phase j by agent m
to form the playing set S
(i)
j+1. Observe that the cardinality of S
(i)
j+1 remains unchanged. Moreover,
the updating ensures that for all agents i ∈ {1, · · · , N} and all phases j, Ŝ(i) ⊂ S(i)j , namely agents
never drop arms from the set Ŝ(i). Hence, we term the set Ŝ(i), sticky.
The pseudo-code of the Algorithm described above is given in Algorithm 1.
3.1 Model Assumptions
We make two mild assumptions on the inputs (a discussion is provided in Appendix A).
(A.1) The communication matrix P is irreducible. Namely, for any two i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N}, with
i 6= j, there exists 2 ≤ l ≤ N and k1, · · · , kl ∈ {1, · · · , N}, with k1 = i and kl = j such that the
product P (k1, k2) · · · , P (kl−1, kl) > 0 is strictly positive.
(A.2) The communication budget (Bt)t∈N and ε > 0 is such that for all D > 0, there exists t0(D)
such that for all t ≥ t0(D), Bt ≥ D log(t) (i.e., Bt = Ω(log(t))). Furthermore, we shall assume a
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convexity condition, i.e., for every x, y ∈ N and λ ∈ [0, 1], Abλx+(1−λ)yc ≤ λAx + (1− λ)Ay, where
the sequence (Ax)x∈N is given in Equation (1). Furthermore,
∑
l≥2
A2l
A3l−1
<∞.
For instance, if Bt = dt1/3e, for all t ≥ 1. and ε < 2, then Ax = bx3c, for all x ≥ 1. Similarly,
if Bt = t, for all t ≥ 1, i.e., if the budget is adequate to communicate in every time slot, then
Ax = d(1 +x)1+εe, for all x ≥ 1. One can check that, both these examples satisfy the conditions in
assumption A.2
3.2 Regret Guarantee
The regret guarantee of Algorithm 1 is given in Theorem 1, which requires a definition. Let N ∈ N
and a P be a N×N gossip matrix. Denote by the random variable τ (P )spr to be the spreading time of
a rumor in a pull model, with a rumor initially in node 1 (cf [32]). Formally, consider a discrete time
stochastic process where initially, node 1 has a rumor. At each time step, each node j ∈ {1, · · · , N}
that does not posses the rumor, calls another node sampled independently of everything else from
the probability distribution P (j, ·). If a node j calls on a node possessing the rumor, node j will
possess the rumor at the end of the call (at the end of current time step). The spreading time τ
(P )
spr
is the stopping time when all nodes possess the rumor for the first time.
Theorem 1. Suppose in a system of N ≥ 2 agents connected by a communication matrix P
satisfying assumption (A.1) and K ≥ 2 arms, each agent runs Algorithm 1, with UCB parameter
α > 3 and communication budget (Bt)t∈N and ε > 0 satisfying assumption (A.2). Then the regret
of any agent i ∈ [N ], after time any time T ∈ N is bounded by
E[R(i)T ] ≤
dKN e+2∑
j=2
1
∆j
 4α ln(T ) + K
4︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collaborative UCB Regret
+ g((Ax)x∈N) + E[A2τ (P )spr ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of Infrequent Pairwise Communications
, (4)
where (Ax)x∈N is given in Equation (1) and g((Ax)x∈N) = Aj∗ + 22α−3
(∑
l≥ j∗
2
−1
A2l+1
A3l−1
)
where
j∗ = 2 max
(
A−1
((
N
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
)) 1
(2α−6)
)
+1,min
{
j ∈ N : Aj −Aj−1
2 + dKN e
≥ 1 + 4α log(Aj)
∆22
})
,
where, A−1(x) = sup{y ∈ N : Ay ≤ x}, ∀x ∈ R+.
3.3 Discussion
In order to get some intuition from the Theorem, we consider a special case. Recall from Equation
(1), that Ax is the time slot when any agent pulls information for the x th time. Thus, if for some
β > 1, the communication budget Bt = bt1/βc, then for all small ε and all large x, the sequence
Ax = dxβe . In other words, if communication budget scales polynomially (but sub-linearly) with
time, then Ax is also polynomial, but super linear. Similarly, if the gossip matrix corresponded
to the complete graph, i.e., P (i, j) = 1/N , for all i 6= j and Ax = xβ, we will show in the sequel
(Corollary 6), that there exists an universal constant C > 0 such that E[A
2τ
(P )
spr
] ≤ (C log(N))β.
Thus, we have the following corollary.
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Corollary 2. Suppose the communication budget satisfies Bt = bt1/βc, for all t ≥ 1, for some
β > 1. Let ε > 0 be sufficiently small. Then the communication sequence (Ax)x∈N in Equation (1)
with ε < β − 1 is such that Ax = dxβe, for all large x. If the gossip matrix connecting the agents
corresponded to the complete graph, i.e., P (i, j) = 1/N , for all i 6= j, then under the conditions of
Theorem 1, the regret of any agent i ∈ {1, · · · , N} at time T ∈ N satisfies
E[R(i)T ] ≤
dKN e+2∑
j=2
1
∆j
 4α ln(T ) + K
4︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collaborative UCB Regret
+
4
2α− 3
pi2
6
3β + 4 max
K 3(2α−6) ,(16α2 + dKN e
∆22
) β
β−1
+ (C log(N))β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of Infrequent Pairwise Communications
,
where C is an universal constant given in Corollary 6.
The proof is provided in Appendix I. The terms denoting cost of pairwise communications
correspond to the average amount of time any agent must wait before the best arm is in the
playing set of that agent. This cost can be decomposed into the sum of two dominant terms. The
term of order
(
dK
N
e
∆2
) 2β
β−1
is the expected number of samples needed to identify the best arm by any
agent. The term (log(N))β is the amount of time taken by a pure gossip process to spread a message
(the best arm in our case) to all agents, if the communication budget is given by Bt = bt1/βc.
3.4 Proof Sketch
The proof of this theorem is carried out in Appendix B and we describe the main ideas here. We
deduce in Proposition 2 that there exists a freezing time τ such that, all agents have the best arm
by time τ and only recommend the best arm from henceforth, i.e., the set of arms of agents do not
change after τ . The technical novelty of our proof is in bounding E[τ ], as this leads to the final
regret bound (Proposition 2).
There are two key challenges in bounding this term. First, the choice of arm recommendation
is based on the most played arm in the current phase, while the choice of arm to pull is based on
samples even in the past phases, as the UCB considers all samples of an arm thus far. If the phase
lengths are large (Equation (1) ensures this), Lemma 8 shows that the probability of an agent
recommending a sub-optimal arm at the end of a phase is small, irrespective of the number of
times it was played till the beginning of the phase. Second, the events that any agent recommends
a sub-optimal arm in different phases are not independent, as the reward samples collected by this
agent, leading to those decisions are shared. We show in Proposition 3 by establishing that after
a random, almost surely finite time (denoted as τ̂stab in Appendix B), agents never recommend
incorrectly.
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3.5 Initialization without Agent IDs
The initialization in Line 2 of Algorithm 1 relies on each agent knowing its identity. However, in
many settings, it may be desirable to have algorithms that do not depend on the agent’s identity.
We outline a simple procedure to fix this (with guarantees) in Appendix L.
4 Asynchronous GosInE Algorithm
A synchronous system is not desirable in many cases as agents could get a large number of message
requests during time slots (Aj)j≥0. Consider an example where the gossip matrix P is a star graph,
i.e., for all i 6= 1, P (i, 1) = 1 and P (1, i) = 1N−1 . In this situation, at time slots (Ax)x∈N, the central
node 1 will receive a (large) N −1 different requests for messages, which may be infeasible if agents
are bandwidth constrained.
We present an asynchronous algorithm to alleviate this problem. This new algorithm is identical
to Algorithm 1 with two main differences - (i) each agent chooses the number of time slots it stays
in any phase j as a random variable independently of everything else, and (ii) when asked for a
recommendation, agents recommend the most played arm in the previous phase. The first point,
ensures that even in the case of the star graph described above, with high probability, eventually,
no two agents will pull information in the same time slot. The second point ensures that even
though the phase lengths are random, the quality of recommendations are good as they are based
on large number of samples. We give a pseudo-code in Algorithm 3 where lines 5 and 18 are new
and lines 8 (agents have different phase lengths) and 9 (arm recommendation from previous phase)
are modified from Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3. Suppose in a system of N ≥ 2 agents connected by a communication matrix P
satisfying assumption (A.1) and K ≥ 2 arms, each agent runs Algorithm 3, with UCB parameter
α > 3, δ > 0 and communication budget (Bt)t∈N and ε > 0 satisfying assumption (A.2). Then the
regret of any agent i ∈ [N ], after any time T ∈ N is bounded by
E[R(i)T ] ≤
dKN e+2∑
j=2
1
∆j
 4α ln(T ) + K
4︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collaborative UCB Regret
+ (1 + δ)E[A
2b2+δcτ (P )spr ] + ĝ((Ax)x∈N, δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of Asynchronous Infrequent Pairwise Communications
,
where ĝ((Ax)x∈N, δ) = 2(1 + δ)
(
A2d2+δej∗ +
(
2
2α−3
)∑
l≥3
A2l
A3l−1
)
, where j∗ given in Theorem 1 and
(Ax)x∈N is given in Equation (1).
4.1 Proof Sketch
The proof of this theorem is carried out in Appendices D,E and F. In order to prove this, we
find it effective to give a more general algorithm (Algorithm 5 in Appendix D) where the agents
choose the phase lengths Pj as a Poisson distributed random variable. This algorithm does not
satisfy the budget constraint exactly, but only in expectation, over the randomization used in the
algorithm. We analyze this in Theorem 10 stated in Appendix D and proved in Appendix E. The
main additional technical challenge is that as the phase lengths of different agents are staggered.
9
Algorithm 3 Asynch GosInE Algorithm (at Agent i)
1: Input: Communication Budget (Bt)t∈N, UCB Parameter α, Slack δ, ε > 0
2: Initialization: Ŝ(i), S
(i)
0 according to Equations (2) and (3) respectively.
3: j ← 0
4: Aj = max
(
min{t ≥ 0, Bt ≥ j}, d(1 + j)1+εe
)
. Reparametrize the communication budget
5: P(i)j ∼ Unif[(Aj −Aj−1), (1 + δ)(Aj −Aj−1)] . Uniformly distributed phase length
6: for Time t ∈ N do
7: Pull - arg max
l∈S(j)i
(
µ̂
(i)
l (t− 1) +
√
α ln(t)
T
(i)
l (t−1)
)
8: if t ==
∑j
y=0 P(i)y then
9: O(i)j ← GET-ARM-PREV(i, t)
10: if O(i)j 6∈ S(j)i then
11: U
(i)
j+1 ← arg maxl∈{U(i)j ,L(i)j }
(
Tl
(∑j
y=0 P(i)y
)
− Tl
(∑j−1
y=0 P(i)y
))
. Most played
arm in current phase
12: L
(i)
j+1 ← O(i)j
13: S
(i)
j+1 ← Ŝ(i) ∪ L(i)j+1 ∪ U (i)j+1 . Update set of playing arms
14: else
15: S
(i)
j+1 ← S(i)j .
16: j ← j + 1
17: Aj = max
(
min{t ≥ 0, Bt ≥ j}, d(1 + j)1+εe
)
. Reparametrize the communication
budget
18: P(i)j ∼ Unif[(Aj −Aj−1), (1 + δ)(Aj −Aj−1)] . Update next phase length
We crucially use the convexity of the sequence (Ax)x∈N (Assumption A.2) in Proposition 6, along
with more involved coupling argument to a rumor spreading process (Proposition 4). The proof of
Theorem 3 is a corollary of the proof of Theorem 10 in Appendix F.
5 Lower Bound
In order to state the lower bound, we will restrict ourselves to a class of consistent policies [21]. A
policy (or algorithm) is consistent, if for any agent i ∈ [N ], and any sub-optimal arm l ∈ {2, · · · ,K},
the expected number of times agent i plays arm l up-to time t ∈ N (denoted by T (i)l (t)) satisfies
for all a > 0, limt→∞
E[T (i)l (t)]
ta = 0.
Theorem 4. The regret of any agent i ∈ [N ] after playing arms for T times under any consistent
policy played by the agents and any communication matrix P satisfies
lim inf
T→∞
E[R(i)T ]
ln(NT )
≥
 1
N
K∑
j=2
∆j
KL(µj , µ1)
 , (5)
where for any a, b ∈ [0, 1], KL(a, b) is the Kullback-Leibler distance between two Bernoulli
distributions with mean a and b.
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Algorithm 4 Asynch Arm Recommendation
procedure Get-Arm-Prev((i,t)) . Input an agent i and time t
m ∼ P (i, ·) . Sample another agent
j ← inf{r ≥ 0 : ∑ry=0 P(m)y ≥ t} . Phase of agent m at time t
Y(m)j−1 ←
∑j−1
y=0 P(m)y , Y(m)j−2 ←
∑j−2
y=0 P(m)y
return arg max
l∈S(j−1)m
(
T
(m)
l (Y(m)j−1)− T (m)l (Y(m)j−2)
)
. Most played arm in phase j − 1
The proof of the theorem is carried out in Appendix H. The proof of this lower bound is based
on a system where there are no communication constraints. From standard inequalities for KL
divergence, we get from Equation (5) that
lim inf
T→∞
E[R(i)T ]
ln(NT )
≥ µ1(1− µ1)
 1
N
K∑
j=2
1
∆j
 . (6)
6 Insights
1. Insensitivity to Communication Constraints - The following corollary follows directly
from Theorems 1 and 3.
Corollary 5. Suppose in a system of N ≥ 2 agents each running Algorithm 1 or 3 with parameters
satisfying conditions in Theorems 1 and 3 respectively. Then, for every agent i ∈ [N ] and time
T ∈ N,
lim sup
T→∞
E[R
(i)
T ]
ln(T )
≤
dKN e+2∑
j=2
4α
∆j
 .
Thus, as long as the gossip matrix P is connected (Assumption A.1) and the communication
budget over a horizon of T is at-least Ω(log(T )), (Assumption A.2), the asymptotic regret of any
agent, is insensitive to P and the communication budget.
2. Benefit of Collaboration - As an example, consider a system where K = N and arm-means
such that ∀j ∈ {2, · · · ,K}, ∆j := ∆ > 0. Let Π be any consistent policy for the agents in the sense
of Theorem 4. Then Equation (6) and Corollary 5 implies that suppi lim supT→∞
E[R(i)T ]
Epi [R(i)T ]
≤ 4αµ1(1−µ1) ,
where in the numerator is the regret obtained by our algorithms and the denominator is by the pol-
icy pi. As ratio of asymptotic regret in our algorithm and the lower bound is a constant independent
of the size of the system, (does not grow with N), our algorithms benefit from collaboration. Recall
that the lower bound is obtained from the full interaction setting where all agents communicate
with every other agent, after every arm pull while in our model, every agent pulls information, a
total of at most o(T) times over a time horizon of T. Thus, we observe that, despite communication
constraints, any agent in our algorithm performs nearly as good as the best possible algorithm
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when agents have no communication constraints, i.e., the regret ratio is a constant independent of
N .
3. Impact of Gossip Matrix P - The second order constant term in the regret bounds in
Theorems 1 and 3 provides a way of quantifying the impact of P , based on its conductance, which
we define now. Given an undirected finite graph G on vertex set V , denote for any vertex u ∈ V ,
deg(u) to be the degree of vertex u in G. For any set H ⊆ V , denote by Vol(H) = ∑u∈H deg(u).
For any two sets H1, H2 ⊆ V , denote by Cut(H1, H2), to be the number of edges in G with one
end in H1 and the other in H2. The conductance of G, denoted by φ is defined as
φ := min
H⊂V :0<Vol(H)≤Vol(V )/2
Cut(H,V \H)
Vol(H)
.
The following corollary, illustrates the intuitive fact that if the conductance of the gossip matrix is
higher, then the regret (the second order constant term) is lower. For sake of clarity, we give the
corollary in the special case of polynomially scaling communication budgets and provide a general
result in the Appendix in Corollary 19.
Corollary 6. Suppose N ≥ 2 agents are connected by a d-regular graph with adjacency matrix AG
having conductance φ and the gossip matrix P = d−1AG. Suppose the communication budget scales
as Bt = bt1/βc, for all t ≥ 1, where β > 1 is arbitrary. If the agents are using Algorithm 1 with
parameters satisfying assumptions in Theorem 1, then for any i ∈ [N ] and T ∈ N
E[R(i)T ] ≤ 4α ln(T )
dKN e+2∑
j=2
1
∆j
+ K
4︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collaborative UCB Regret
+
(
2C
log(N)
φ
)β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Impact of Gossip Matrix
+ 2
3β
2α− 3
pi2
6
+ (j∗)β + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Constant Independent of P
,
where j∗ is a constant independent of the gossip matrix P , depending only on N,K and ∆2 (given
in Theorem 1).
The proof is provided in Appendix J. Notice, that the only term in the regret that depends on
the graph is the conductance φ. In order to derive some intuition, we consider two examples - one
wherein the N agents are connected by a complete graph, and one wherein they are connected by
the ring graph. The conductance of the complete graph is N2(N−1) , while that of the ring graph is
2
N . Thus, the cost of communications scales as (4C log(N))
β for the complete graph, but scales
as (4C log(N)N)β in the ring graph. This shows the reduction in regret that is possible by a
‘more’ connected gossip matrix, where the regret is reduced from order (N log(N))β to (log(N))2β
on moving from the ring graph to the complete graph. This is also demonstrated empirically in
Figures 1 and 2.
4. Regret/Communication Trade-off - For a fixed problem instance and gossip matrix P ,
reducing the total number of information pulls, i.e., reducing the rate of growth of (Bx)x∈N increases
the per-agent regret. This can be inferred by examining the cost of communications in Equation
(4), which we state in the following corollary.
Corollary 7. Suppose, Algorithm 1 is run with K arms and N agents connected by a gossip matrix
P , with two different communication schedules (A
(1)
x )x∈N and (A
(2)
x )x∈N, such that limx→∞ A
(1)
x
A
(2)
x
= 0.
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Figure 1: (N,K) are (25, 75) and (15, 50) respectively.
Then there exist positive constants N0,K0 ∈ N (depending on the two communication sequences),
such that for all N ≥ N0 and K ≥ K0, and P , the cost of communications in the regret bound in
Equation (4) is ordered as
g((A(1)x )) + E[A
(1)
2τ
(P )
spr
] ≥ g((A(2)x )) + E[A(2)
2τ
(P )
spr
].
The proof of this corollary is provided in the Appendix K. In light of Equation (4) in Theorem 1,
the above corollary makes precise the qualitative fact that if agents are allowed more communication
budget, then they experience lesser regret. We demonstrate this empirically in Figure 3.
7 Numerical Results
We evaluate our algorithm and the insights empirically. Each plot is the regret averaged over
all agents, is produced after 30 and 100 random runs for Algorithms 1 and Algorithm 3 (with
δ = 0.5) respectively, along with 95% confidence intervals. We also plot the two benchmarks of no
interaction among agents (where a single agent is running the UCB-4 algorithm of [3]) and the sys-
tem corresponding to complete interaction, where all agents are playing the UCB-4 algorithm with
entire system history of all arms pulled and rewards obtained by all agents as described in Section 5.
Synthetic Experiments - We consider a synthetic setup with ∆ = 0.1, µ1 = 0.95, µ2 = 0.85,
rest of the arm means sampled uniformly in (0, 0.85]. In Figures 1 and 2, we consider the impact
of gossip matrix by fixing the communication budget Bt = bt1/3c (Ax = x3) and varying P to be
the complete and cycle graph among agents. We see that our algorithms are effective in leveraging
collaboration in both settings and experiences a lower regret in the complete graph case as opposed
to the cycle graph, as predicted by our insights.
In Figure 3, we compare the effect of communication budget by considering two scenarios -
polynomial budget Bt = bt1/3c (Ax = x3) and logarithmic budget Bt = blog2(t)c (Ax = 2x). We
see that even under a logarithmic communication budget, our algorithms achieve significant regret
reduction.
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Figure 2: (N,K) are (25, 75) and (15, 50) respectively.
Figure 3: (N,K) as (20, 70) and (5, 20) and the graphs are complete and cycle respectively.
Real Data - In Figure 4, we run our Algorithms on MovieLens data [14] using the methodology
in [31]. This dataset contains 6k movies rated by 4k users. We treat the movies as arms and
estimate the arm-means from the data by averaging the ratings of a section of similar users (same
age, gender and occupation and have rated at-least 30 movies). We further select only those movies
that have at least 30 ratings by users in the chosen user category. We estimate the missing entries
in the sub-matrix (of selected users and movies) using matrix completion [15] and choose a random
set of 30 and 40 movies, in Figure 4. We compare against [31] (hyperparameter ε = 0.1) for the
setting of complete graph among agents and communication budget Bt = bt1/3c. We see that in all
settings, our algorithm has superior performance and strongly benefits from limited collaboration.
8 Related Work
The closest to our work is [31] which introduced a model similar to ours. However, the present
paper improves on the algorithm in [31] in three aspects: (i) our algorithm can handle any gossip
matrix P , while that of [31] can only handle complete graphs and (ii), the algorithm in [31], needs
as an input, a lower bound on the arm gap between the best and the second best arm, while
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Figure 4: (N,K) are (10, 30) and (15, 40) respectively.
our algorithms do not require any such knowledge and (iii), our regret scaling is superior even on
complete graphs.
The multi-agent MAB was first introduced in the non-stochastic setting in [6] and further
developed in [10]. However, there was no notion of communication budgets in these models. Subse-
quently, [18] considered the regret/communication trade-off in the non-stochastic setting, different
from our stochastic MAB model. In the stochastic setting, the papers of [12],[9], [29], [19], [22] con-
sider a collaborative multi agent model where agents minimize individual regret in a decentralized
manner. In these models, communications is not an active decision made by agents, rather agents
can observe neighbor’s actions and are, therefore, different from our setup, where agents actively
choose to communicate depending on a budget. The papers of [16] and [33] study the benefit of
collaboration in reducing simple regret, unlike the cumulative regret considered in our paper. The
paper of [20] considers a distributed version of contextual bandits, in which agents could share
information, whose length grows with time and thus different from our setup. There has also been
a lot of recent interest in ‘competitive’ multi-agent bandits ([1], [26], [30], [4], [17], [7],[28],[27]),
where if multiple agents choose the same arm in a time slot, then they experience a ‘collision’ and
receive small reward (only a subset (possibly empty) gets a reward). This differs from our setup
where even on collision, agents receive independent rewards.
9 Conclusions
We introduced novel algorithms for multi agent MAB, where agents play from a subset of arms
and recommend arm-IDs. Our algorithms leverage collaboration effectively and in particular, its
performance (asymptotic regret) is insensitive to the communication constraints. Furthermore, our
algorithm exhibits a regret communication trade-off, namely achieves lower regret (finite time) with
increased communications (budget or conductance of P ), which we characterize through explicit
bounds.
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Appendix A Discussion on Technical Assumptions in Section 3.1
Assumption A.1 states that the graph of communication among agents is connected. Observe
that if A.1 is not satisfied, then there exists at-least a pair of agents that can never exchange
information among each other, making the setup degenerate. Assumption A.2 implies that, any
agent over a time interval of T arm-pulls, can engage in information-pulls, at-least Ω(log(T )) times.
The convergence of the series in A.2 also hold true for all ‘natural’ examples, such as exponential
and polynomial. For instance, the series is convergent if for all large l, either Bl = d 1D logβ(l)e
or Bl = dl1/(D+1)e, for all D > 0 and β > 1. Thus, conditions A.1 and A.2 do not impact any
practical insights we can draw from our results.
Appendix B Proof of Theorem 1
In order to give the proof, we first set some notations and definitions. We make explicit a probability
space construction from [23], that makes the proof simpler. We assume that there is a sequence
of independent {0, 1} valued random variables (Y (i)j (t))i∈[N ],j∈[K],t≥0, where for every j ∈ [K], the
collection (Y
(i)
j (t))t≥0,i∈[N ] is an i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable of mean µj . The interpretation
being that if an agent i pulls arm j for the lth time, it will receive reward Y
(i)
j (l). Additionally,
we also have on the probability space a sequence of independent [N ] valued random variables
(Z
(i)
j )j≥0,i∈[N ], where for each i ∈ [N ], the sequence (Z(i)j )j≥0 is iid distributed as P (i, ·). The
interpretation is that when agent i wishes to receive a recommendation at the end of phase j, it
will do so from agent Z
(i)
j .
B.1 Definitions and Notations
In order to analyze the algorithm, we set some definitions. Let B(i)j to be the best arm in S(i)j , i.e.,
µB(i)j
= max
l∈S(i)j
µl. Observe that since the set S
(i)
j is random, B(i)j is also a random variable. For
every agent i ∈ [N ] and phase j ≥ 0, we denote by Ô(i)j ∈ S(i)j to be that arm, that agent i played
the most in phase j. Note, from the algorithm, if any agent i
′
pulled an arm from agent i at the
end of phase j for a recommendation, it would have received arm Ô(i)j .
Fix an agent i ∈ [N ] and phase j ≥ 0. Let S(i) be a collection of all subsets S ⊂ [K] of
cardinality |S| = dKN e + 2, such that 1 ∈ S, Ŝ(i) ⊂ S. For any S ∈ S(i), index the elements in
S as {l1, · · · , ldK
N
e+2} in increasing order of arm-ids. Let a1, · · · adK
N
e+2 ∈ Nd
K
N
e+2 be such that∑dK
N
e+2
m=0 am ≥ 0. For every agent i ∈ [N ], phase j ≥ 0 and (a1, · · · , adK
N
e+2) ∈ Nd
K
N
e+2, denote by
the event ξ
(i)
j (S; a1, · · · , adK
N
e) as
ξ
(i)
j (S; a1, · · · , adK
N
e) :=
{
S
(i)
j = S, Tl1(Aj−1) = a1, · · · , TldK
N
e+2(Aj−1)
= adK
N
e+2, Ô(i)j 6= 1
}
.
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Denote by Ξ
(i)
j as the union of all such events, i.e.,
Ξ
(i)
j :=
⋃
S∈S(i)
 ⋃(
a1,···adK
N
e+2
)
∈NdKN e+2
ξ
(i)
j (S; a1, · · · , adK
N
e)
 ,
and by χ
(i)
j its indicator random variable, i.e.,
χ
(i)
j = 1Ξ(i)j
. (7)
In words, the event χ
(i)
j is the indicator variable indicating whether agent i does not recom-
mend the best arm at the end of phase j, under some sample path, i.e., we take an union over all
possible set of playing arms that contain arm 1 (i.e., set S(i)) and all possible number of plays of
the various arms in S until the beginning of phase j (i.e., the set of histories in Aj). In Lemma
8, we provide an upper bound to this quantity. Notice from the construction that for each agent
i ∈ [N ] and phase j ≥ 0, the random variable χ(i)j is measurable with respect to the reward sequence
(Y
(i)
j (t))j∈[K],t∈[0,Aj ]. Also, trivially by definition, observe that χ
(i)
j ≥ 1Ô(i)j 6=1,1∈S(i)j almost-surely.
This is so since χ
(i)
j is an union bound over all possible realizations of the communication sequence
and reward sequence of other agents, while 1Ô(i)j 6=1,1∈S(i)j
considers a particular realization of the
communication and rewards of other agents.
We now define certain random times that will be useful in the analysis.
τ̂
(i)
stab = inf{j
′ ≥ j∗ : ∀j ≥ j′ , χ(i)j = 0},
τ̂stab = max
i∈[N ]
τ̂
(i)
stab,
τ̂ (i)spr = inf{j ≥ τ̂stab : 1 ∈ S(i)j } − τ̂stab,
τ̂spr = max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
τ̂ (i)spr,
τ = τ̂stab + τ̂spr.
In words, τ̂
(i)
stab is the earliest phase such that, for all subsequent phases, if agent i has the best
arm, then it will recommend the best arm. The time τ̂
(i)
spr is the number of phases it takes after τ̂stab
for agent i to have arm 1 in its playing set. The following proposition follows from the definition
of the random times.
Proposition 1. For all agents i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, we have almost-surely,⋂
j≥τ
S
(i)
j = S
(i)
τ ,
Ô(i)l = 1 ∀l ≥ τ, ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
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Proof. Fix any agent i ∈ [N ] and any phase j ≥ τ . Since τ ≥ τ̂ (i)stab, we have for all j ≥ τ ,
χ
(i)
j = 0. (8)
Furthermore, from the definition of χ
(i)
j , we know that
χ
(i)
j ≥ 11∈S(i)j ,Ô(i)j 6=1, (9)
almost-surely. However, as τ ≥ τ̂ (i)spr + τ̂stab, we know that
1 ∈ S(i)j . (10)
Thus, from Equations (8), (9) and (10), we have that Ô(i)j = 1. Since j ≥ τ was arbitrary, we have
that for all j ≥ τ , Ô(i)j = 1. Since agent i ∈ [N ] was arbitrary, we have that for all agents i ∈ [N ]
and all phases j ≥ τ , we have Ô(i)j =1. From the Algorithm, we know that any agent will change
its set of arms only if the recommendation it receives is not present in the playing set (see line 8 of
Algorithm 1). The preceding argument says that is not the case and hence for all agents i ∈ [N ],⋂
j≥τ S
(i)
j = S
(i)
τ .
In other words, after phase τ , the system is frozen, i.e., the set of arms of all agents remain fixed
for all time in the future. Moreover, all agents will only recommend the best arm going forward
from this phase. We will show in the sequel that E[Aτ ] < ∞ for all settings of the algorithm and
hence the system freezes after only almost-surely finitely many changes in the set of arms played
by the different agents.
B.2 Intermediate Propositions
Proposition 2. The regret of any agent i ∈ {1, · · · , N} after playing for T steps is bounded by
E[R(i)T ] ≤ E[Aτ ] +
K
4
+ 4α ln(T )
dKN e+2∑
j=2
1
∆j
 .
Proof. From the definition of regret, we can write,
R
(i)
T =
T∑
l=1
(µ1 − µI(i)l ),
=
T∑
l=1
K∑
j=2
∆j1I(i)l =j
,
≤ Aτ +
T∑
l=Aτ̂+1
K∑
j=2
∆j1I(i)l =j
,
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= Aτ +
K∑
j=2
∆j
T∑
l=Aτ˜+1
1
I
(i)
l =j
.
Thus, taking expectations on both sides, we get that
E[R(i)T ] ≤ E[Aτ ] +
K∑
j=2
∆j
T∑
l=Aτ+1
P[I(i)l = j, j ∈ S(i)τ ]. (11)
We can break up the summation on the RHS as follows. Fix an arm j ∈ {2, · · · ,K} and evaluate
the sum
T∑
l=Aτ+1
P[I(i)l = j, j ∈ S(i)τ ] =
T∑
l=Aτ+1
P
[
I
(i)
l = j, T
(i)
j (l) ≤
4α ln(T )
∆2j
, j ∈ S(i)τ
]
+ (12)
T∑
l=Aτ+1
P
[
I
(i)
l = j, T
(i)
j (l) ≥
4α ln(T )
∆2j
, j ∈ S(i)τ
]
,
≤ 4α ln(T )
∆2j
P[j ∈ S(i)τ ] +
T∑
l=Aτ+1
P
[
I
(i)
l = j, T
(i)
j (l) ≥
4α ln(T )
∆2j
]
,
≤ 4α ln(T )
∆2j
P[j ∈ S(i)τ ] +
∞∑
l=3
2l2(1−α), (13)
where in the last line we substitute the classical estimate from [3]. We can use this estimate, as
we know that both the best arm, i.e., arm indexed 1 and the sub-optimal arm indexed j are in
the set S
(i)
τ and hence the agent can potentially play those arms. Now plugging Equation (13) into
Equation (11), we get that
E[R(i)T ] ≤ E[Aτ ] +
K∑
j=2
∆j
(
4α ln(T )
∆2j
P[j ∈ S(i)τ ] +
∞∑
l=3
2l2(1−α)
)
,
(a)
≤ E[Aτ ] + 4α ln(T )
∆
K∑
j=2
P[j ∈ S(i)τ ] +
K∑
j=2
∆j
4
,
(b)
≤ E[Aτ ] + 4α ln(T )
∆
(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 2
)
+
K
4
.
In step (a), we use the bound that ∆j ≥ ∆, for all j ∈ {2, · · · ,K} and the fact that for α > 3, we
have
∑∞
l=3 2l
2(1−α) ≤ 1/8. In step (b), we use the crucial identity that for any agent i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
and any phase ψ either deterministic or random, we have almost-surely,
K∑
j=1
1
j∈S(i)ψ
=
⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 2.
Taking expectations on both sides yields the result. If one were more precise in step (a), then
it is possible to establish that
E[R(i)T ] ≤ E[Aτ ] + 4α ln(T )
K∑
j=2
1
∆j
P[j ∈ S(i)τ ] +
K∑
j=2
∆j
4
,
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≤ E[Aτ ] + 4α ln(T )
dKN e+2∑
j=2
1
∆j
+ K∑
j=2
∆j
4
.
This will then yield the proof.
Proposition 3. For all N ∈ N, ∆ ∈ (0, 1], α > 3 and M > 0,
E[Aτ ] ≤ Aj∗ + 2
2α− 3
∑
l≥ j∗
2
−1
A2l+1
A3l−1
+ E[A2τ̂spr ],
where j∗ is defined in Theorem 1.
Proof. Recall the fact that for any N valued random variable X, its expectation can be written as
a sum of its tail probabilities, i.e., E[X] =
∑
t≥1 P[X ≥ t]. We use this fact to bound the expected
value of E[Aτ ] as
E[Aτ ] =
∑
t≥1
P[Aτ ≥ t],
(a)
≤
∑
t≥1
P[τ ≥ A−1(t)],
=
∑
t≥1
P[τ̂stab + τ̂spr ≥ A−1(t)],
≤
∑
t≥1
P
[
τ̂stab ≥ 1
2
(A−1(t))
]
+
∑
t≥1
P
[
τ̂spr ≥ 1
2
(
A−1(t)
)]
,
≤ Aj∗ +
∑
t≥Aj∗+1
P
[
τ̂stab ≥ 1
2
(
A−1(t)
)]
+ E[A2τ̂spr ].
Step (a) follows from the definition of A−1(·) given in Theorem 1. The estimate for E[A(2τ˜spr)]
follows by noticing that this random variable can be coupled to the spreading time for a classical
rumor spreading model, which we do so in the sequel in Proposition 4. The first summation can be
bounded by using estimates from Lemma 8. We do so by applying a union bound over all agents
and phases as follows. Fix some x ≥ j∗/2 in the following calculations.
P[τ̂stab ≥ x] = P
[
N⋃
i=1
τ̂
(i)
stab ≥ x
]
,
≤
N∑
i=1
P[τ̂ (i)stab ≥ x],
=
N∑
i=1
P
[ ∞⋃
l=x
χ
(i)
l = 1
]
,
≤
N∑
i=1
∑
l≥x
P
[
χ
(i)
l = 1
]
,
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(a)
≤
N∑
i=1
∑
l≥x
2
2α− 3
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
)
A
−(2α−3)
l−1 ,
=
∑
l≥x
2
2α− 3N
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
)
A
−(2α−3)
l−1 ,
(b)
≤ 2
2α− 3
∑
l≥x
A−3l−1,
In the above calculations, we use the bound from Lemma 8 in step (a) as x ≥ j∗/2. In step (b), we
use N
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
)
≤
(
A j∗
2
−1
)2α−6
, which follows from the definition of j∗ given in Theorem
1. Thus, we can obtain the following.
∑
t≥Aj∗+1
P
[
τ̂stab ≥ 1
2
(
A−1(t)
)] ≤ ∑
t≥Aj∗+1
(
2
2α− 3
) ∑
l≥ 1
2
A−1(t)
A−3l−1,
≤
(
2
2α− 3
) ∑
t≥Aj∗+1
∑
l≥ 1
2
A−1(t)
A−3l−1,
(c)
≤
(
2
2α− 3
) ∑
l≥ 1
2
A−1(Aj∗+1)
A2l∑
t=Aj∗+1
A−3l−1,
≤
(
2
2α− 3
) ∑
l≥ j∗
2
A2l
A3l−1
<∞.
Step (c) follows by swapping the order of summations. The condition A.2 in Section 3.1 satisfied
by the sequence (Aj)j∈N ensures that the last summation is finite.
Proposition 4. The random variable τ̂spr is stochastically dominated by τ
(P )
spr .
Proof. We construct a coupling of the spreading process induced by our algorithm and a PULL
based rumor spreading on P . We construct the coupling as follows. First we sample the reward
vectors (Y
(i)
j (t))i∈[N ],j∈[K],t≥0. Then we can construct the random variable τ̂stab, which is a mea-
surable function of the reward vectors. We then sample the communication random variables of
our algorithm (Z
(i)
j )i∈[N ],j≥0. We then construct a PULL based communication protocol with the
random variables (Z
(i)
j )i∈[N ],j≥τ̂stab . Since τ̂stab is independent of (Z
(i)
j )i∈[N ],j≥0, the sequence of
(Z
(i)
j−τ̂stab)i∈[N ],j≥τ̂stab is identically distributed as (Z
(i)
j )i∈[N ],j≥0.
Now, for the stochastic domination, consider the case where in the PULL based system, which
starts at phase (time) τ̂stab, only agent 1 has the rumor (best-arm). By definition of τ̂stab, any agent
that contacts another agent possesing the rumor (best-arm), is also aware of the rumor (best-arm).
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The stochastic domination is concluded as at phase τ̂stab, many agents may be aware of the rumor
(best-arm) in our algorithm, while in the rumor spreading process, only agent 1 is aware of the
rumor at phase τ̂ .
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We can conclude Theorem 1 by plugging in the estimates from Propositions 3 and 4 into
Proposition 2.
Appendix C Analysis of the UCB Error Estimates
Lemma 8. For any agent i ∈ [N ] and phase j such that Aj−Aj−1
2+dK
n
e ≥ 1 +
4α log(Aj)
∆2
, we have
E[χ(i)j ] ≤
2
2α− 3
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
)(
1
A2α−3j−1
)
,
where χ
(i)
j is defined in Equation (7).
Proof. As the algorithm recommends the most played arm in a phase, the arm that is recom-
mended (i.e., O(i)j ) must be payed by agent i at-least Aj−Aj−1|S(i)j | times in phase j. This follows from
an elementary pigeon hole argument. Let S(i) be the collection of all subsets S ⊂ {1, · · · ,K}
such that Ŝ(i) ⊂ S and 1 ∈ S. Let Aj be a collection of all N valued tuples (a1, · · · adK
N
e+2) ∈
N s.t.
∑dK
N
e+2
m=0 am = Aj−1. We shall however, consider all possible histories, i.e., N
dK
N
e+2.
E[χ(i)j ]
(a)
≤
∑
S∈S(i)
P
 ⋃
(a1,···adK
N
e+2)∈N
dK
N
e+2
χ
(i)
j (S; a1, · · · , adK
N
e)
 ,
(b)
≤
∑
S∈S(i)
P
 ⋃
(a1,···adK
N
e+2)∈N
dK
N
e+2
⋃
l∈S,l 6=1
T
(i)
l (Aj)− T (i)l (Aj−1) ≥
Aj −Aj−1
|S|
 ,
(c)
≤
∑
S∈S(i)
Aj∑
t=Aj−1+
Aj−Aj−1
|S(i)
j
|
P
 ⋃
(a1,···adK
N
e+2)∈N
dK
N
e+2
⋃
l∈S,l 6=1
T
(i)
l (t− 1)− T (i)l (Aj−1) =
Aj −Aj−1
|S(i)j |
− 1, I(i)t = l
 ,
(d)
≤
∑
S∈S(i)
Aj∑
t=Aj−1+
Aj−Aj−1
|S(i)
j
|
∑
l∈S,l 6=1
P
 ⋃
(a1,···adK
N
e+2)∈N
dK
N
e+2
T
(i)
l (t− 1)− T (i)l (Aj−1) =
Aj −Aj−1
|S(i)j |
− 1, I(i)t = l
 ,
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(e)
≤
∑
S∈S(i)
∑
l∈S,l 6=1
Aj∑
t=Aj−1+
Aj−Aj−1
|S(i)
j
|
P
[
T
(i)
l (t− 1) ≥
Aj −Aj−1
|S(i)j |
− 1,UCB(i)l (t) ≥ UCB(i)1 (t)
]
,
(14)
(f)
≤
∑
S∈S(i)
∑
l∈S,l 6=1
Aj∑
t=Aj−1+
Aj−Aj−1
|S(i)
j
|
2t2(1−α). (15)
Step (a) follows from an union bound over S(i). In step (b) we use the fact that if an arm l has
to be the most played, then it must be played at-least
Aj−Aj−1
|S| times. In step (c), we search over
times, when the number of times arm l has been played exceeds
Aj−Aj−1
|S| exactly. In step (d), we
use an union bound over S. In step (e), for any arm l ∈ S, UCB(i)l (t) = µ̂(i)l (t− 1) +
√
α ln(t)
T
(i)
l (t−1)
. In
step (e), we ask that arm l and 1 has been played at-least 0 or more times in the past before time t
and that the UCB index of arm l at agent i at time t, exceed that of the index of the best arm. In
step (f), we plug in the classical estimate from [3]. This bound is applicable in our case as 1 ∈ S
and the arm gap between the best and the second best arm in S is at-least ∆. Furthermore, the
condition in the lemma
Aj−Aj−1
2+dK
n
e ≥ 1 +
4α log(Aj)
∆2
implies that for all t ∈
[
Aj−1 +
Aj−Aj−1
|S(i)j |
, Aj
]
, the
conditions in the bound in [3] is satisfied and is hence applicable. Notice that |S(i)| ≤ (K2 ). Thus,
switching the order of summation and simplifying Equation 15, we get
E[χ(i)j ] ≤
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
) Aj∑
t=Aj−1+
Aj−Aj−1
|S(i)
j
|
2t2(1−α)
≤ 2
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
)∫ Aj
Aj−1
u2(1−α)du
≤ 2
2α− 3
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
)(
1
A2α−3j−1
− 1
A2α−3j
)
.
Similarly, we also have a bound on the error probability in the case of random phase length
system in the following lemma.
Lemma 9. For any agent i ∈ [N ] and every j ∈ N such that Aj−Aj−1
2+dK
n
e ≥ 1 +
4α log(Aj)
∆2
, we have
E[χ(i)j 1j≥H∗ ] ≤
2
2α− 3
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
)(
1
A2α−3j−1
)
,
where χ
(i)
j is defined in Equation (17).
Proof. The proof is identical to that in Lemma 8 upto Equation 14, where the upper limit of
summation is (1 + δ)Aj in the asynchronous communication scenario. Continuing with the rest of
the calculation, identical to that in Lemma 8 yields the result.
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Appendix D Poisson Asynchronous Algorithm - Buildup to Proof
of Theorem 3
In order to prove Theorem 3, we will state a more general algorithm in the sequel in Algorithm 5
and prove a performance bound on it in Theorem 10. We shall then subsequently prove Theorem
10 in Appendix E and as a corollary of the proof, deduce Theorem 3 in Appendix F.
Algorithm 5 Distributed Poisson Asynchronous MAB Regret Minimization (at Agent i)
1: Input Parameters: Communication Budget (Bt)t∈N, UCB Parameter α, Slack δ, ε > 0
2: Initialization: Ŝ(i), S
(0)
i according to Equations (2) and (3).
3: j ← 0
4: Aj = max
(
inf{t ≥ 0, Bt ≥ j}, (1 + j)1+ε
)
. Reparametrize the commuication budget
5: Pj ∼ Poisson[(Aj −Aj−1), (1 + δ)(Aj −Aj−1)] . Poisson distributed phase length
6: for Time t ∈ N do
7: Pull arm - arg max
l∈S(j)i
(
µ̂
(i)
l (t− 1) +
√
α ln(t)
T
(i)
l (t−1)
)
8: if t ==
∑j
y=0 Py then
9: O
(j)
i ← GET-ARM-PREV(i, t) . Given in Algorithm 4
10: if O
(j)
i 6∈ S(j)i then
11: U
(i)
j+1 ← arg maxl∈{U(i)j ,L(i)j }(Tl(Aj)− Tl(Aj−1)) . The most played arm
12: L
(i)
j+1 ← O(i)j . Update the set of playing arms
13: S
(i)
j+1 ← Ŝ(i) ∪ L(i)j+1 ∪ U (i)j+1
14: else
15: S
(i)
j+1 ← S(i)j .
16: j ← j + 1
17: Aj = max
(
inf{t ≥ 0, Bt ≥ j}, (1 + j)1+ε
)
. Reparametrize the commuication budget
18: Pj ∼ Poisson[(Aj −Aj−1), (1 + δ)(Aj −Aj−1)]
This algorithm does not fit our framework exactly, as the communication budget is not nec-
essarily met. In particular, this algorithm only ensures that with high probability, the number of
information pulls by agents in the first t time slots is within the prescribed budget Bt. Thus, we
present this algorithm in the Appendix and not as a solution to the multi-agent MAB problem. In
order to prove this result, we will need a further assumption on the input parameters.
(A.3) - The communication budget (Bt)t∈N and ε > 0 is such that ∃ κ > 0,
∑
x≥1AAxe
−κ(Ax−Ax−1) <
∞, where (Ax)x∈N is given in Equation (1).
Theorem 10. Suppose in a system of N ≥ 2 agents connected by a communication matrix P
satisfying assumption A.1 and K ≥ 2 arms, each agent runs Algorithm 5, with input parameters
(Bt)t∈N, and the UCB parameter α > 3 and ε > 0 satisfying assumptions A.2 and A.3 and
δ > 0 such that ∃D > 0 with c(δ) ≥ 54D and (3 + 2δ + ln(4 + 2δ)) ≥ 54D−1, where c(δ) =
min
(
δ
2 + ln
(
1 + δ2
)
, (1 + δ) ln
(
2+2δ
2+δ
)
− δ2
)
. Then the regret of any agent i ∈ [N ], after any time
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T ∈ N is bounded by
E[R(i)T ] ≤
dKN e+2∑
j=2
1
∆j
 4α ln(T ) + K
4︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collaborative UCB Regret
+ (1 + δ)E[A
2b2+δcτ (P )spr ] + ĝ1((Ax)x∈N, δ) +Nĝ2((Ax)x∈N, δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of Asynchronous Infrequent Pairwise Communications
,
where
ĝ1((Ax)x∈N, δ) = 2(1 + δ)
A2d2+δej∗ + ( 22α− 3
)∑
l≥3
A2l
A3l−1
+ 2
∑
x≥d j∗
2
e
(Ad4d2+δexe)(2(2α−6)+2)e−c(δ)(Ax+1−Ax)
 ,
and
ĝ2((Ax)x∈N, δ) = 2
A2x0e−c(δ)(Ax0−Ax0−1) +∑
x≥1
Axe
−c(δ)Aωx
+ 1
c(δ)
+
(1 + δ)
2∑
x≥1
AdAxee
−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1) +N
∑
t≥1
e−(3+2δ+ln(4+2δ))A
−1(t)
 ,
where j∗ is given in Theorem 1, and x0 ∈ N is from Assumption A.2 in Section 3.1.
The proof of this theorem is carried out in Appendix E.
Appendix E Proof of Theorem 10
For every agent i ∈ [N ] and phase j ≥ 0, we shall denote by P(i)j ∈ N to be the number of times
agent i pulls an arm in phase j. Notice from the conditions on the input parameter (pj)j∈N that
the following property is satisfied - ∑
j≥0
P[Pj ≤ Aj −Aj−1] <∞,∑
j≥0
P[Pj ≥ (1 + δ)(Aj −Aj−1)] <∞.
(16)
To make things simpler, we shall consider the following probability space. As before, it contains
the reward and communication random variables (Y
(i)
j (t))i∈[N ],j∈[K],t≥0 and (Z
(i)
j )j≥0,i∈[N ]. For
every j ∈ [K], the collection (Y (i)j (t))t≥0,i∈[N ] is an i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable of mean µj .
The interpretation being that if an agent i pulls arm j for the lth time, it will receive reward Y
(i)
j (l).
Similarly, for each i ∈ [N ], the sequence (Z(i)j )j≥0 is iid distributed as P (i, ·). The interpretation
is that when agent i wishes to receive a recommendation at the end of phase j, it will do so from
agent Z
(i)
j . In addition, we also assume that the probability space consists of another independent
sequence (P(i)j )i∈[N ],j≥0, where for each i ∈ [N ] and j ≥ 0, the random variable P(i)j is independent
of everything else and distributed as a Poisson random variable with mean
(
1 + δ2
)
(Aj+1 −Aj).
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E.1 Definition and Notations
To proceed with the analysis, define by a N valued random variable H∗ as
H∗ = inf
{
j
′ ≥ 0 : ∀i ∈ [1, N ], ∀j ≥ j′ ,P(i)j ∈ [Aj −Aj−1, (1 + δ)(Aj −Aj−1)]
}
,
Equations (16) imply from Borel Cantelli lemma that H∗ <∞ almost-surely. We will need another
random variable Γ ∈ N, which is defined as
Γ = sup
t ≥ 0 : ∃i ∈ [N ],
H∗∑
j=0
P(i)j ≥ t
 .
In words, Γ represents the time when the last agent shift to phase H∗. Similar to that done in the
proof of Theorem 1, we define a sequence of indicator random variables (χ
(i)
j )j≥0,i∈[N ] as follows.
The definition is identical to the one used in the proof of Theorem 1, which we reproduce here for
completeness. Fix some agent i ∈ [N ] and phase j ≥ 0. Denote by S(i) as the collection of all
subsets S of [K] with cardinality dKN e + 2, such that Ŝ(i) ⊂ S and 1 ∈ S. Clearly, |S(i)| ≤
(
K
2
)
.
Denote by the tuples (a1, · · · , adK
N
e+2) ∈ Nd
K
N
e+2 such that
∑dK
N
e+2
m=0 am ≥ 0. For any set S ∈ S(i)
and tuples (a1, · · · , adK
N
e+2) ∈ Aj , denote by the event ξ(i)j (S, a1, · · · , adK
N
e+2) as
ξ
(i)
j (S, a1, · · · , adK
N
e+2) :=
{
S
(i)
j = S, Tl1(Aj−1) = a1, · · · , TldK
N
e+2
(Aj−1) = adK
N
e+2, Ô(i)j 6= 1
}
.
Denote by Ξ
(i)
j as the union of all such events above, i.e.,
Ξ
(i)
j :=
⋃
S∈S(i)
 ⋃
(a1,··· ,adK
N
e+2)∈N
dK
N
e+2
ξ
(i)
j (S, a1, · · · , adK
N
e+2)
 .
Denote by χ
(i)
j as the indicator random variable, i.e.,
χ
(i)
j = 1Ξ(i)j
. (17)
Observe that, as before, for all agents i ∈ [N ] and phases j ≥ 0, the random variable ξ(i)j is
measurable with respect to the reward sequence (Y
(i)
l )l≤Aj . Furthermore, we have the almost-sure
inequality that
ξ
(i)
j ≥ 11∈S(i)j ,Ô(i)j 6=1,j≥H∗ .
This follows from the same reasoning as in Theorem 1 as ξ
(i)
j considers all possible sample paths for
communication while 1
1∈S(i)j ,Ô(i)j 6=1,j≥H∗
is for a particular sample path of communications among
agents. Notice that since the phase lengths are random, we can only reason about the sample path
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for agent phases larger than or equal to H∗.
Similar to before, we define the random variables τ̂
(i)
stab, τ̂stab, τ̂
(i)
spr and τ̂spr. Denote by τ =
τ̂stab + τ̂spr. These definitions from the Proof of Theorem 1 are reproduced here for completeness.
τ̂
(i)
stab = inf{j
′ ≥ j∗ : ∀j ≥ j′ , χ(i)j = 0},
τ̂stab = max
i∈[N ]
τ̂
(i)
stab,
τ̂ (i)spr = inf{j ≥ τ̂stab : 1 ∈ S(i)j } − τ̂stab,
τ̂spr = max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
τ̂ (i)spr,
τ = τ̂stab + τ̂spr.
From the definitions, the statement and proof of Proposition 1 holds verbatim for the present
algorithm as well. We will need two additional definitions to help state our result. Denote by
Tstab ∈ N to be the first time when all agents pull arms and are in phase τ̂stab or larger, i.e.,
Tstab = sup
t ≥ Γ : ∃i ∈ [N ],
τ̂stab∑
j=0
P(i)j ≥ t
 .
Similarly, define H to be the maximum over all agents phases at time Tstab, i.e.,
H = sup
{
j ≥ 0 : ∃i ∈ [N ],
j∑
l=0
P(i)l ≤ Tstab
}
.
Similarly, denote by T as the first time when all agents pull arms in phase τ or larger, i.e.,
T = sup
t ≥ 0 : ∃i ∈ [N ],
τ∑
j=0
P(i)j ≥ t

E.2 Structural Results
In this section, we give inequalities relating the random variables defined in the previous section,
that will be helpful in proving Theorem 3.
Lemma 11.
E[T ] ≤ E[Tstab] + (1 + δ)(E[AH+(2τ (P )spr −1)b2+δc+1 −AH ])
where the random variable τ
(P )
spr is independent of H.
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. First, we will construct a coupling with a standard PULL
based rumor process on the communication matrix P such that H and τ
(P )
spr are independent. Then
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we shall argue a stochastic domination and for the constructed coupling show that, almost-surely,
we have
T ≤ Tstab + (1 + δ)(AH+(τ (P )spr −1)b2+δc+1 −AH) (18)
where τ
(P )
spr is independent of H and ≤st represents stochastic domination. This will then conclude
the proof by taking expectations on both sides.
(1) Coupling Construction - We proceed with the coupling as follows. We assume that our
probability space consists of the random variables (Y
(i)
j )i∈[N ],j∈[K],l≥0, (P(i)j )j≥0,i∈[N ], (Z(i)j )j≥0,i∈[N ]
and (Ẑ
(i)
j )j≥0,i∈[N ]. The sequence (Y
(i)
j )i∈[N ],j∈[K],l≥0 is independent of everything else and is used to
construct the observed rewards of agents. The sequence (P(i)j )j≥0,i∈[N ] is independent of everything
else and denotes the phase length random variables of agents as before. The sequence (Ẑ
(i)
j )j≥0,i∈[N ]
denotes a standard PULL based rumor spreading process on P , independent of everything else. In
other words, for each agent i ∈ [N ], the sequence (Ẑ(i)j )j≥0 is i.i.d., with each element distributed
according to the distribution P (i, ·). Thus, they represent the sequence of callers called by agent
i in the PULL based rumor process. The random communication sequence (Z
(i)
j )j≥0,i∈[N ] will be
constructed such that it is independent of (Y
(i)
j )i∈[N ],j∈[K],l≥0, (P(i)j )j≥0,i∈[N ], and equal in distribu-
tion to (Ẑ
(i)
j )j≥0,i∈[N ] such that the stochastic domination in Equation (18) holds.
To do so, we will recursively define a sequence of random times (ti)i≥0 which are measurable with
respect to the agent rewards and phases, i.e., for all i ≥ 0, ti ∈ σ((Y (i)j (l))i∈[N ],j∈[K],l≥0, (P(i)j )j≥0,i∈[N ]).
Let t0 = Tstab. We know that Tstab is measurable only with respect to the reward random variables
(Y
(i)
j (l))i∈[N ],j∈[K],l≥0 and the phase lengths of the agents (P(i)j )j≥0,i∈[N ]. For all i ≥ 1, let ti be
the first time after ti−1, such that all agents have changed phase at-least once in the time interval
[ti−1, ti]. More formally, we have
ti = inf
{
x > ti−1 : ∀i ∈ [N ],∃j ∈ N s.t.
j∑
l=0
P(i)l ≥ ti−1,
j+1∑
l=0
P(i)l ≤ x
}
.
We construct another sequence of random variables (j
(i)
x )x≥0,i∈[N ], where for every agent i ∈ [N ]
and x ≥ 0, j(i)x is the first phase change of agent i in the time interval [tx, tx+1) of our algorithm,
i.e.,
j(i)x = inf
{
j ≥ 0 :
j−1∑
l=0
P(i)l < tx,
j∑
l=0
P(i)l ≥ tx
}
,
where
∑−1
l=0 = 0. By construction observe that for all agents i ∈ [N ] and all x ≥ 0, the random
variable j
(i)
x is measurable with respect to the rewards and phase lengths.
Equipped with these definitions, we construct the communication random variables of our al-
gorithm (Z
(i)
j )j≥0,i∈[N ] as follows. For every agent i ∈ [N ] and x ≥ 0, we let
Z
(i)
j
(i)
2x
= Ẑ(i)x .
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For an agent i ∈ [N ], and any phase j 6∈ {j(i)x , x ≥ 0}, we let Z(i)j be i.i.d., from P (i, ·).
We only look at alternate intervals [t0, t1], [t2, t3] and so on because in our algorithm, an agent
recommends the most played arm in the previous phase. Thus, if an agent becomes aware of the
best arm in interval say [t0, t1], then it will definitely recommend it in phase [t2, t3], if asked, as
since t2 ≥ Γ, agent will recommend the best arm, and moreover at-least one phase elapses after the
agent receives the best arm.
(2) Stochastic Domination - We now conclude about the stochastic domination as follows.
In the algorithm, we will only consider even time intervals [t0, t1], [t2, t3] and so on, where an
agent becomes newly aware of the best arm. This is so since our recommendation algorithm only
recommends the best arm in the previous phase. At time t0, exactly one agent knows the rumor
in the PULL rumor spreading process while potentially more agents may be aware of the rumor
(best-arm) in the algorithm. Furthermore, we consider that there is exactly one communication
request in the rumor spreading process per even time-interval, (i.e., in [t0, t1), [t2, t3) and so on),
while potentially many more can occur in our algorithm. Thus, we have the following almost-sure
bound under the afore mentioned coupling,
T ≤ t
2τ
(P )
spr
. (19)
(3) Deterministic Bounds on (tx)x≥0- If we further establish that for all x ≥ 0, almost-surely,
we have
tx ≤ Tstab + (1 + δ)(AH+(x−1)b2+δc+1 −AH), (20)
then we can conclude the proof from Equations (19) and (20). To establish Equation (20), first
observe that Tstab ≥ Γ almost-surely. Thus, if any agent i ∈ [N ] will be in any phase j, for at-least
Aj − Aj−1 number of arm-pulls and for at-most (1 + δ)(Aj − Aj−1) number of arm-pulls. Thus,
by definition at time t0, we know that no agent is in phase H + 1 or beyond. Thus, at time
t0 + (1 + δ)(AH+1−AH), we know that all agents would have changed phase at-least once after t0.
Thus, t1 ≤ t0 + (1 + δ)(AH+1 −AH) almost-surely.
We now make the above into an induction argument. For the base case, suppose that at time
t0, all agents are within phase H − which is true by definition. For all 0 ≤ x′ ≤ x, assume the
induction hypothesis that
tx′+1 ≤ tx′ + (1 + δ)(AH+x′b2+δc+1 −AH+x′b2+δc),
and that all agents at time tx′+1 are at phase H+(x
′
+1)b2+δc or lower. Since tx ≥ Γ, we know that
in the time interval [tx, tx+(1+δ)(AH+xb2+δc+1−AH+xb2+δc)], all agents would have changed phase
at-least once. Thus, tx+1 ≤ tx+(1+δ)(AH+xb2+δc+1−AH+xb2+δc). It now remains to conclude that
all agents will be in phase H+(x+1)b2+δc or lower at time tx+(1+δ)(AH+xb2+δc+1−AH+xb2+δc).
Notice that the maximum phase any agent can be in at time tx+(1+δ)(AH+xb2+δc+1−AH+xb2+δc),
given that it was in a phase H + xb2 + δc or lower at time tx is bounded above by Proposition 6 as
H + xb2 + δc + b2 + δc. This then concludes the induction step and hence we have for all x ≥ 0,
almost-surely, by a simple telescoping sum
tx ≤ t0 + (1 + δ)
x−1∑
l=0
(AH+lb2+δc+1 −AH+lb2+δc),
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≤ t0 + (1 + δ)(AH+(x−1)b2+δc+1 −AH).
Lemma 12. For any agent i ∈ [N ], the regret after it has pulled arms for T times is bounded by
E[R(i)T ] ≤ E[T ] +
K
4
+ 4α
dKN e+1∑
j=1
1
∆j
 ln(T ).
Proof. The proof of this Lemma follows similarly to that of Lemma 2. We can write the regret of
any agent i ∈ [N ] as follows -
R
(i)
T =
T∑
t=1
µ1 − µI(i)t ,
≤ T +
T∑
t=T +1
µ1 − µI(i)t ,
= T +
T∑
t=T +1+1
K∑
l=2
∆l1I(i)t =l
,
(a)
= T +
K∑
l=2
∆l
T∑
t=T +1
1
I
(i)
t =l
1
l∈S(i)τ
In step (a), we use Proposition 1 that at time T , all agents are in a phase that is at-least τ . Fur-
thermore, from Proposition 1 (recall that the statement and proof of Proposition 1 holds verbatim
for the present case also) implies almost-surely that, for all j ≥ τ , and all i ∈ [N ], S(i)j = S(i)τ .
Taking expectations on the last display yields
E[R(i)T ] ≤ E[T ] +
K∑
l=2
∆l
T∑
t=T +1
P[I(i)t = l, l ∈ S(i)τ ]
Using the same techniques as in the proof of Proposition 2, i.e., following all steps from Equation
13 onwards, one obtains
K∑
l=2
∆l
T∑
t=T +1
P[I(i)t = l, l ∈ S(i)τ ] ≤
dKN e+2∑
j=2
1
∆j
 4α ln(T ) + K
4
Lemma 13.
E[T ] ≤ E[Γ] + (1 + δ)E[Aτ̂stab ] + (1 + δ)E[A4Γ] + (1 + δ)E[A4d1+δeτ̂stab ] + (1 + δ)E[A2b2+δcτ (P )spr ].
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Proof. From Lemma 11, we know that
E[T ] ≤ E[Tstab] + (1 + δ)E[(AH+(τ (P )spr −1)b2+δc+1 −AH)],
(a)
≤ E[Tstab] + (1 + δ)(E[A2H ] + E[A2b2+δcτ (P )spr ]),
(b)
≤ E[Γ] + (1 + δ)E[Aτ̂stab ] + (1 + δ)E[A2Γ+2d1+δeτ̂stab ] + (1 + δ)E[A2b2+δcτ (P )spr ],
(c)
≤ E[Γ] + (1 + δ)E[Aτ̂stab ] + (1 + δ)E[A4Γ] + (1 + δ)E[A4d1+δeτ̂stab ] + (1 + δ)E[A2b2+δcτ (P )spr ].
Steps (a) and (c) follow from the elementary fact that for any two random variables X and Y and
any invertible function f(·), E[f(X+Y )] ≤ E[f(2X)] +E[f(2Y )]. Step (b) follows from Lemma 14.
Lemma 14.
E[Tstab] ≤ E[Γ] + (1 + δ)E[Aτ̂stab ].
Proof. The first inequality follows as the time taken to reach Tstab is upper bounded by the time it
takes all agents to reach phase τ̂stab after time Γ. However, by definition we know that all agents
last in any phase j after time Γ for at-most (1 + δ)(Aj+1 − Aj) arm-pulls. The upper bound is
concluded by noticing that an agent can be in a phase no smaller than 0 at time Γ and subsequently
it takes an agent a maximum of (1 + δ)Aτ̂stab time to reach phase τ̂stab.
Lemma 15. Almost-surely, we have
H ≤ Γ + d1 + δeτ̂stab.
Proof. Notice that at time Γ, the maximum phase any agent can be in is Γ. This follows from
the trivial upper bound, where in each time step, an agent increases its phase by one in each time
slot. After time Γ, we know by definition, that any agent plays arms at-least Aj −Aj−1 times and
at-most (1 + δ)(Aj −Aj−1) in phase j. Thus, the total number of phase changes an agent will have
in the time interval [Γ + 1, Tstab] is at-most A
−1(Tstab − Γ). Thus, we get
H ≤ Γ +A−1(Tstab − Γ),
(a)
≤ Γ +A−1((1 + δ)Aτ̂stab),
(b)
≤ Γ +A−1(Ad1+δeτ̂stab),
≤ Γ + d1 + δeτ̂stab.
Step (a) follows from Lemma 14, step (b) follows from convexity of (Ax)x≥1 and the last inequality
follows from the definition of A−1(·).
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E.3 Quantitative Results
In this section, we compute quantitative bounds in terms of the algorithm’ input parameters.
Proposition 5. For all x ≥ 2 and δ > 0,
P[H∗ > l] ≤ 2N
∑
x≥l
e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1),
where c(δ) = min
(
δ
2 + ln
(
1 + δ2
)
, (1 + δ) ln
(
2+2δ
2+δ
)
− δ2
)
.
Proof. From the definition of H∗, we have
P[H∗ ≥ l] = P
 N⋃
i=1
⋃
x≥l
Poisson
((
1 +
δ
2
)
(Ax −Ax−1)
)
/∈ [(Ax −Ax−1), (1 + δ)(Ax −Ax−1)]
 ,
≤ N
∑
x≥l
P
[
Poisson
((
1 +
δ
2
)
(Ax −Ax−1)
)
/∈ [(Ax −Ax−1), (1 + δ)(Ax −Ax−1)]
]
,
≤ N
∑
x≥l
(2e−2c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1)).
In the last inequality, we use the classical large-deviation estimate for a Poisson random variable.
Lemma 16.
E[Γ] ≤ 2N
A2x0e−c(δ)(Ax0−Ax0−1) +∑
x≥1
Axe
−c(δ)Aωx−1
+ N
c(δ)
,
where c(δ) is given in Proposition 5 and x0 is from Assumption A.2 in Section 3.1.
Proof. We start by computing the tail probability P[Γ > t]. The key observation to do so is the
following inequality. For every L ≥ 0, we have
P[Γ ≥ t] ≤ P[H∗ ≥ L] + P
 N⋃
i=1
L∑
j=0
P(i)j ≤ t
 .
We will then compute E[Γ] by choosing L = A−1(t). We shall compute each of these terms
separately.
P[H∗ ≥ A−(t)] = P
 N⋃
i=1
⋃
x≥A−1(t)
P(i)x 6∈ [(Ax −Ax−1), (1 + δ)(Ax −Ax−1)]
 ,
≤ N
∑
x≥A−1(t)
2e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1),
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where the second inequality follows from Proposition 5. Similarly, standard large deviation esti-
mates for Poisson random variables (observe that for all L,
∑L
j=0 P(i)j is Poisson distributed with
mean L ) and union bound gives
P
 N⋃
i=1
L∑
j=0
P(i)j ≤ t
 ≤ Ne−c(δ)t.
Thus, we can bound E[Γ] as
E[Γ] ≤
∑
t≥1
P[Γ ≥ t],
≤ 2N
∑
t≥1
∑
x≥A−1(t)
e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1) +N
∑
t≥1
e−c(δ)t,
(a)
≤ 2N
∑
x≥1
Ax∑
t=1
e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1) +N
∑
t≥1
e−c(δ)t,
(b)
≤ 2N
A2x0e−c(δ)(Ax0−Ax0−1) +∑
x≥1
Axe
−c(δ)Aωx−1
+N ∫
t≥0
e−c(δ)tdt,
= 2N
A2x0e−c(δ)(Ax0−Ax0−1) +∑
x≥1
Axe
−c(δ)Aωx−1
+ N
c(δ)
.
Step (a) follows from changing the order of summation (which is licit as all terms are positive) and
step (b) follows from the assumption A.2 in Section 3.1. Standard results from analysis gives that
the series in the last display is finite as c(δ) > 0 and Ax ≤ A2x ≤ A3x−1, where the second inequality
follows from Assumption A.2 in Section 3.1.
Lemma 17. For all δ > 0 such that c(δ) > 54D and (3 + 2δ + ln(4 + 2δ)) ≥ 54D−1, where c(δ) is
given in Proposition 5 and D is in Assumption A.2 in Section 3.1,
E[A4Γ] ≤ 2N
∑
x≥1
AAxe
−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1) +N
∑
t≥1
e−(3+2δ+ln(4+2δ))A
−1(t).
Proof. Observe that E[A4Γ] ≤
∑
t≥1 P
[
Γ ≥ 14A−1(t)
]
. We use similar ideas as in Lemma 16 to
bound the tail probability. Recall that for any t ≥ 1 and any L ≥ 1, the following bound holds
P[Γ ≥ t] ≤ P[H∗ ≥ L] + P
 N⋃
i=1
L∑
j=0
P(i)j ≤ t
 ,
≤ P[H∗ ≥ L] +NP
[
Poisson
((
1 +
δ
2
)
AL
)
≤ t
]
.
In this proof, we shall use L = A−1
(
A−1(t)
)
. Thus,
P
[
Γ ≥ 1
4
A−1(t)
]
≤ P [H∗ ≥ A−1 (A−1(t))]+NP [Poisson((1 + δ
2
)
AA−1(A−1(t))
)
≤ 1
4
A−1(t)
]
,
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= P
[
H∗ ≥ A−1 (A−1(t))]+NP [Poisson((1 + δ
2
)
A−1(t)
)
≤ 1
4
A−1(t)
]
,
≤ 2N
∑
x≥A−1( 1MA−1(t))
e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1) +Ne−(3+2δ+ln(4+2δ))A
−1(t).
The last display follows from Proposition 5 and standard Poisson random variable Chernoff bound.
Thus, we can bound E[A4Γ] as
E[A4Γ] ≤
∑
t≥1
P
[
Γ ≥ 1
4
A−1(t)
]
,
≤ 2N
∑
t≥1
∑
x≥A−1(A−1(t))
e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1) +N
∑
t≥1
e−(3+2δ+ln(4+2δ))A
−1(t),
(a)
= 2N
∑
x≥1
A(Ax)∑
t=1
e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1) +N
∑
t≥1
e−(3+2δ+ln(4+2δ))A
−1(t),
= 2N
∑
x≥1
AAxe
−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1) +N
∑
t≥1
e−(3+2δ+ln(4+2δ))A
−1(t).
We will choose δ sufficiently large so that both the series are convergent. This is possible as the
maps δ −→ c(δ) and δ −→ (3 + 2δ+ ln(4 + 2δ)) are non-decreasing and limδ→∞ c(δ) = limδ→∞(3 +
2δ + ln(4 + 2δ)) = ∞. Observe that since Ax ≤ eDx, for all large x, we have A−1(t) ≥ 1D ln(t).
Thus, if c(δ) ≥ 54D and (3 + 2δ + ln(4 + 2δ)) > D−1, both series are convergent.
Lemma 18. For any C ≥ 2,
E[ACτ̂stab ] ≤ AdC
2
ej∗ +
(
2
2α− 3
)∑
l≥3
A2l
A3l−1
+ 2
∑
x≥d j∗
2
e
(AdCxe)(2(2α−6)+2)e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1),
where c(δ) is given in Proposition 5 and j∗ is given in Theorem 1.
Proof. We start with the definition of expectation and repeatedly applying union bound yields,
E[ACτ̂stab ] =
∑
t≥1
P[ACτ̂stab ≥ t],
≤
∑
t≥1
P
[
τ̂stab ≥ 1
C
A−1(t)
]
,
≤ AdC
2
ej∗ +
∑
t≥AdC2 ej∗+1
P
[
τ̂stab ≥ 1
C
A−1(t)
]
,
≤ AdC
2
ej∗ +
∑
t≥AdC2 ej∗+1
P
 N⋃
i=1
⋃
l≥ 1
C
A−1(t)
χ
(i)
l = 0
 ,
≤ AdC
2
ej∗ +
∑
t≥AdC2 ej∗+1
NP
 ⋃
l≥ 1
C
A−1(t)
χ
(i)
l = 0
 ,
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≤ AdC
2
ej∗ +
∑
t≥AdC2 ej∗+1
N
∑
l≥ 1
C
A−1(t)
(
P[χ(i)l = 0, l ≥ H∗] + P[χ(i)l = 0, l < H∗]
)
,
≤ AdC
2
ej∗ +
∑
t≥AdC2 ej∗+1
N
∑
l≥ 1
C
A−1(t)
(
P[χ(i)l = 0, l ≥ H∗] + P[l < H∗]
)
,
= AdC
2
ej∗ +
∑
t≥AdC2 ej∗+1
N
∑
l≥ 1
C
A−1(t)
P[χ(i)l = 0, l ≥ H∗] +
∑
t≥AdC2 ej∗+1
∑
l≥ 1
C
A−1(t)
NP[l < H∗],
(a)
≤ AdC
2
ej∗ +
(
2
2α− 3
)∑
l≥3
A2l
A3l−1
+
∑
t≥AdC2 ej∗+1
∑
l≥ 1
C
A−1(t)
NP[l < H∗].
Step (a) follows as C ≥ 2, and hence, the first summation follows from identical calculations as
carried out in Proposition 3. This is so as the bound in Lemma 8 and in Lemma 9 are identical.
Thus, the first series is upper bounded by
(
2
2α−3
)∑
l≥3
A2l
A3l−1
. We shall now estimate the second
series. ∑
t≥AdC2 ej∗+1
∑
l≥ 1
C
A−1(t)
NP[l < H∗] ≤
∑
l≥d j∗
2
e
AdCle∑
t=AdC2 ej∗
+1
NP[l < H∗],
≤
∑
l≥d j∗
2
e
NAdCleP[l < H∗],
(b)
≤
∑
l≥d j∗
2
e
N2AdCle
∑
x≥l
2e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1),
= N2
∑
x≥d j∗
2
e
x∑
l=d j∗
2
e
AdCle2e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1),
≤ N2
∑
x≥d j∗
2
e
xAdCxee−c(δ)A
ω
x−1 ,
(c)
≤
∑
x≥d j∗
2
e
(AdCxe)2(2α−6)+22e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1),
(d)
< ∞.
Step (b) follows from Proposition 5 and in step (c), we use the fact that for all x ≥ j∗2 , we have
N ≤ A2α−6x . Step (d) follows from Assumption A.2 that for all sufficiently large l, A2l ≤ A3l , which
on iterating yields that for all large x and any C ≥ 2, we have ACx ≤ A3dlog2(C)ex . Thus, we have
the following chain of inequalities.∑
x≥d j∗
2
e
(AdCxe)2(2α−6)+22e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1) ≤
∑
x≥d j∗
2
e
(Ax)
3dlog2(C)e(2(2α−6)+2)2e−c(δ)(Ax−Ax−1),
(e)
≤ D1
∑
x≥2
AD2x e
−cAωx−1 <∞.
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for some D1, D2, ω
′
> 0. Step (e) follows as we can replace the tail terms of the series with
Ax − Ax−1 ≥ Aωx−1 from Assumption A.2. The finiteness of the series in (e) is a standard fact
from real analysis and can be proven for instance through a Taylor series approximation of the
exponential function.
E.4 Proof of Theorem 10
The proof of Theorem 3 is concluded by using estimates in Lemmas 16 and 18 into Lemmas 13 and
12.
Appendix F Proof of Theorem 3
The proof follows identical steps as that of Theorem 10, with the exception that H∗ = Γ = 0 almost-
surely. More precisely, substituting these two facts in Lemma 13 and re-using all the remaining
structural and quantitative results from the proof of Theorem 10 will yield the desired result.
Appendix G Auxillary Results
Proposition 6. For each δ > 0, y ≥ 0 and convex sequence (Aj)j≥0, we have
sup{j + x ≥ 0 : ∃j ≤ y + 1, (Aj+x −Aj) ≤ (1 + δ)(Ay+1 −Ay)} ≤ y + b2 + δc
Proof. Let x ≥ 0 and j ≤ y + 1 be such that
(Aj+x + (1 + δ)Ay) ≤ (1 + δ)Ay+1 +Aj . (21)
Now since j ≤ y + 1, and (Al)l≥0 is non-decreasing, the above inequality implies
Aj+x + (1 + δ)Ay
2 + δ
≤ Ay+1.
Now, let j + x = y + b2 + δc+ k, for some k ≥ 0. From convexity of (Aj)j≥1, we have
A
y+
b2+δc+k
2+δ
≤ Aj+x + (1 + δ)Ay
2 + δ
≤ Ay+1
But for all k ≥ 1, we have A
y+
b2+δc+k
2+δ
> Ay+1 and hence k = 0 is the only possibility such that
Equation (21) holds.
Appendix H Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. In order to prove the bound, we shall consider a system of full interaction among agents,
where there are no constraints on communications. In this system, each agent after pulling an
arm and observing a reward, communicates this information (the arm pulled and reward observed)
to central board. Thus, at the beginning of each time-step, every agent has access to the entire
39
system history (arms pulled and rewards obtained) up-to the previous time step, by which to base
the current time step’s action (arm pull) on. As all agents have access to the same history at the
beginning of a time step, the optimal strategy to minimize per agent regret is one where in each
time step, all agents play the same arm. Hence, this system is equivalent to a single leader playing
arms, such that on playing any arm at any time, the leader observes N i.i.d. reward samples from
the chosen arm, each corresponding to the obtained reward by the agents. From henceforth, we
mean by the full interaction setting, as one wherein a single leader agent pull an arm at each time
step, and observes N i.i.d. reward samples from the chosen arm.
By construction, a lower bound for regret incurred by the leader agent in the full interaction
setting forms a lower bound on the per-agent regret in our model with communication constraints.
This is so, since the leader agent in full interaction setting can ‘simulate’ any feasible policy of any
agent i ∈ [N ] with communication constraints among agents. Notice that each time the leader agent
in the full-interaction setting plays an arm, it receives N i.i.d. samples of rewards, corresponding
to the reward on that arm obtained by the N agents. We will consider an alternate system where
a fictitious leader agent plays for NT time steps, where at each time, the fictitious agent is playing
arms, as a measurable function of its observed history. From standard results, (for eg. [21]), the
total regret of the fictitious agent, after NT arm-pulls satisfies
lim inf
T→∞
E[R(fictitious)NT ]
ln(NT )
≥
K−1∑
j=1
∆j
KL(µj , µ1)
 , (22)
Now, we shall argue that the preceding display implies the desired lower bound on per-agent
regret in the full interaction setting. Fix some a ∈ {0, · · · , N − 1}. Denote, by the regret incurred
by the fictitious agent at time steps a,N + a, · · · , N(T − 1) + a as R(f)a . Clearly
∑N
a=1R(f)a =
E[R(fictitious)NT ].
Denote by Πagent to be the set of consistent policies for the agents in the full-interaction setting
and by Πfictitious as the set of all consistent policies for the fictitious agent. Denote by the set
of policies Π˜fictitious ⊂ Πfictitious, as those policies for the fictitious agents, where for any policy
pi ∈ Π˜fictitious, the arms played at time instants N, 2N, · · · , NT , belong to Πagent. Furthermore,
for all a ∈ {1, · · · , T}, and all b ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1}, and all pi ∈ Π˜fictitious, the arm chosen by pi at
time instant aN is the same as the arm chosen at time-instant aN + b. In other words, the the set
of policies Π˜fictitious are the ones that any agent under the full interaction setting of our model can
play. This definitions now give us for any a ∈ {0, · · · , N − 1}
inf
pi∈Πagent
E[R(i)T ] = inf
pi∈Π˜fictitious
R(f)a ,
= inf
pi∈Π˜fictitious
1
N
N∑
a=1
R(f)a ,
= inf
pi∈Π˜fictitious
1
N
E[R(fictitious)NT ],
≥ inf
pi∈Πfictitious
1
N
E[R(fictitious)NT ].
40
The first equality follows as under any policy in Π˜fictitious, the arms played by the fictitious agent
only chooses potentially new arms to play at instants N, 2N, · · · . Now, using Equation (22), we get
from the previous display, that for any policy pi ∈ Πagent,
lim inf
T→∞
E[R(i)T ]
ln(NT )
≥
 1
N
∑
j≥1
∆j
KL(µj , µ1)
 .
Appendix I Proof of Corollary 2
In order to prove the corollary, we first establish that Ax ≤ 2xβ, for all small ε in Equation (1).
Notice from Equation (1) that for all x ∈ N, we have
Ax = max
(
min{t ∈ N : Bt ≥ x}, d(1 + x)1+εe
)
,
= max
(
min{t ∈ N : Bt ≥ x}, d(1 + x)1+εe
)
,
≤ max
(
xβ, (1 + x)1+ε
)
,
≤ max(2xβ, 2x1+ε),
= 2xβ,
where the last equality follows since ε < β−1. Furthermore, for all x ≥ x0 where ε < β ln(x0)ln(x0+1) −1,
we have Ax = x
β. Such a x0 exists since β − 1 > 0. Moreover, from definition of Ax, we have
Ax ≥ xβ, for all x.
Recall that g((Ax)x∈N) = Aj∗+ 22α−3
∑
l≥ j∗
2
−1
A2l+1
A3l−1
. We first bound the series term in as follows
∑
l≥ j∗
2
−1
A2l+1
A3l−1
(a)
≤
∑
l≥2
2
(2l + 1)β
(l − 1)3β , (23)
≤ 2
∑
l≥2
3β
1
(l − 1)2β ,
≤ 2pi
2
6
3β. (24)
We now bound j∗ in this case. Recall that
j∗ = 2 max
(
A−1
((
N
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
)) 1
(2α−6)
)
+ 1,min
{
j ∈ N : Aj −Aj−1
2 + dKN e
≥ 1 + 4α log(Aj)
∆22
})
,
≤ 2 max
(
K
3
β(2α−6) + 1,min
{
j ∈ N : j
β − (2(j − 1))β
2 + dKN e
≥ 1 + 4α log(j
β)
∆22
})
,
≤ 2 max
(
K
3
β(2α−6) ,min
{
j ∈ N : j
β − (2(j − 1))β
2 + dKN e
≥ 8α log(j
β)
∆22
})
,
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≤ 2 max
K 3β(2α−6) ,(16α2 + dKN e
∆22
) 1
β−1
 .
Thus, we have
Aj∗ ≤ 2(j∗)β,
≤ 4 max
K 3(2α−6) ,(16α2 + dKN e
∆22
) β
β−1
 . (25)
. Thus from Equations (24) and (25), we get that
g((Ax)x∈N) ≤ 4
2α− 3
pi2
6
3β + 4 max
K 3(2α−6) ,(16α2 + dKN e
∆22
) β
β−1
 .
The proof is completed thanks to the formula in Corollary 19.
Appendix J Impact of Gossip Matrix P
Corollary 19. Suppose N ≥ 2 agents are connected by a d-regular graph with adjacency matrix
AG having conductance φ and the gossip matrix P = d
−1AG. If the agents are using Algorithm 1
with parameters satisfying assumptions in Theorem 1, then for any i ∈ [N ] and T ∈ N
E[R(i)T ] ≤ 4α ln(T )
dKN e+2∑
j=2
1
∆j
+ K
4︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collaborative UCB Regret
+A
2C
log(N)
φ
+ g ((Ax)x∈N) +Aj∗ + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of Pairwise Communications
,
where g(·) is from Theorem 1, and C > 0 is an universal constant stated in Lemma 20 in the
Appendix. Similarly, if all agents run Algorithm 3 with assumptions as in Theorem 3, then
E[R(i)T ] ≤ 4α ln(T )
dKN e+2∑
j=2
1
∆j
+ K
4︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collaborative UCB Regret
+ (1 + δ)A
2b2+δcC log(N)
φ
+ ĝ ((Ax)x∈N, δ) + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of Pairwise Communications
,
where ĝ(·) is given in Theorem 3.
Proof. The proof follows if we establish that E[A
2τ
(P )
spr
] ≤ A 2C log(N)
φ
+ 1 and E[A
2b2+δcτ (P )spr ] ≤
A 2b2+δcC log(N)
φ
+ 1. We can bound them using the main result from [13], restated as Lemma 20
in the sequel. That lemma in particular gives that, one can compute E[A
2τ
(P )
spr
] as follows.
E[A
2τ
(P )
spr
] ≤ A 2C log(N)
φ
+
∑
t≥A 2C log(N)
φ
P[A
2τ
(P )
spr
≥ t],
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≤ A 2C log(N)
φ
+
∑
l≥1
P
[
A
2τ
(P )
spr
≥ A 2Cl log(N)
φ
]
A 2Cl log(N)
φ
,
≤ A 2C log(N)
φ
+
∑
l≥1
P
[
2τ (P )spr ≥
2Cl log(N)
φ
]
A 2Cl log(N)
φ
,
(a)
≤ A 2C log(N)
φ
+
∑
l≥1
e−4llog(N)A 2Cl log(N)
φ
,
(b)
≤ A 2C log(N)
φ
+
∑
l≥1
e−2llog(N),
(c)
≤ A 2C log(N)
φ
+ 1.
In step (a), we use the estimate from Lemma 20. In step (b), we use the additional assumption
in the corollary that Al ≤ eDl, for all D > 0. Thus, we can choose D ≤ φC to arrive at the conclusion
in step (b). In step (c), we use N ≥ 2 to bound the geometric series. Similar computation will yield
the bound on E[A
2b2+δcτ (P )spr ].
Lemma 20. There exists an universal constant C > 0, such that for every d ≥ 2 regular graph on
N vertices with conductance φ, the spreading time of the standard PULL process completes in time
τ
(P )
spr which satisfies for all l ∈ N,
P
[
τ (P )spr ≥ Cl
log(N)
φ
]
≤ N−4l.
Proof. The main result (Lemma 6) of [13] gives that there exists a constant C > 0, such that for
all d-regular graphs with conductance φ, the spreading time satisfies
P
[
τ (P )spr ≥ C
log(N)
φ
]
≤ N−4.
Now, given any l ∈ N, we can now divide the time into intervals
[
0, C log(N)φ
]
,
[
C log(N)φ , 2C
log(N)
φ
]
, · · ·
,
[
C(l − 1) log(N)φ , Cl log(N)φ
]
. For the event
{
τ
(P )
spr ≥ Cl log(N)φ
}
to occur, we need the spreading to
be not finished in each of the l intervals. However, at the beginning of each interval, we know that
at-least one node is informed of the rumor. Thus, the probability, that the rumor spreading does
not complete in a single interval is at-most N−4, which follows from monotonicity, where we can
bound by saying that exactly one worst-case node is aware of the rumor. As the sequence of callers
is independent across intervals, the probability that rumor spreading fails in all l intervals is then
at-most N−4l.
Appendix K Regret Communication Tradeoff - Proof of Corollary
7
Proof. Consider a fixed (A
(1)
x )x∈N and (A
(2)
x )x∈N, such that limx→∞ A
(1)
x
A
(2)
x
= 0. The ordering on
E[(A
(P )
2τspr
)(1)] ≤ E[(A(P )2τspr)(2)] follows trivially as P is fixed for the two cases. It suffices to show
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that there exist positive constants N0 and K0 (depending on (A
(1)
x )x∈N and (A
(2)
x )x∈N)), such
that for all N ≥ N0 and K ≥ K0, g(A(1)x ) ≤ g(A(2)x ). If N or K is sufficiently large, then
(j∗)(i) = 2(A−1)(i)
((
N
(
K
2
)(⌈
K
N
⌉
+ 1
)) 1
(2α−6)
)
, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Notice that
g((A(2)x ))− g((A(1)x )) = A(2)(j∗)(2) −A
(1)
(j∗)(1) +
 22α− 3
 ∑
l≥ (j∗)(2)
2
−1
A
(2)
2l+1
(A
(2)
l−1)3
− 22α− 3
 ∑
l≥ (j∗)(1)
2
−1
A
(1)
2l+1
(A
(1)
l−1)3

 ,
≥ A(2)
(j∗)(2) −A
(1)
(j∗)(1) −
2
2α− 3
∑
l≥1
A
(1)
2l+1
(A
(1)
l−1)3
 . (26)
Notice that A
(2)
(j∗)(2) − A
(1)
(j∗)(1) > 0 and scaling (is monotone non-decreasing) with N and K.
In other words, for fixed K, limN→∞(A
(2)
(j∗)(2) − A
(1)
(j∗)(1)) = ∞ and for fixed N , limK→∞(A
(2)
(j∗)(2) −
A
(1)
(j∗)(1)) = ∞. This follows as (A
(i)
x )x≥1 is super-linear for i ∈ {1, 2} and limx→∞ A
(1)
x
A
(2)
x
= 0.
From the hypothesis that the two communication sequences satisfy assumption A.2, we have that
2
2α−3
(∑
l≥1
A
(1)
2l+1
(A
(1)
l−1)3
)
< ∞ and independent of N and K. Thus, for all large N or K, Equation
(26), simplifies to g(A
(2)
x )− g(A(1)x ) > 0.
Appendix L An Algorithm without using agent ids
The initialization in Line 2 of Algorithms 1 and 3 relied on each agent knowing its identity. However,
in many settings, it may be desirable to have algorithms that do not depend on the agent’s identity.
We outline here a randomized initialization procedure in Line 2 to convert Algorithms 1 and 3 to
one without using agent ids. Fix some γ ∈ (0, 1). We replace Line 2 in Algorithms 1 and 3 with a
randomization, where each agent i ∈ [N ] chooses independently of other agents, a uniformly random
subset of size
⌈
ln
(
1
γ
)
K
N
⌉
+ 2 from the set of K arms as S
(i)
0 . Each agent i, then subsequently
chooses a random subset of size
⌈
ln
(
1
γ
)
K
N
⌉
uniformly at random from S
(i)
0 as its ‘sticky set’ Ŝ
(i).
The rest of the algorithms from Line 3 will be identical. One can then immediately see that the
regret guarantees stated in Theorems 1 and 3 hold verbatim for this modification, with probability
at-least 1−γ, where the probability is over the initial random assignment of the sets Ŝ(i) to agents.
More precisely, with probability at-least 1− γ, the above random initialization ensures that there
exists an agent i ∈ [N ], such that the best arm 1 ∈ Ŝ(i). On this event, the regret guarantees along
with the same proof of Theorems 1 and 3 hold.
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